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“CONDITIONAL ADMISSION” AND
OTHER MYSTERIES: SETTING THE
RECORD STRAIGHT ON THE
“ADMISSION” STATUS OF REFUGEES
AND ASYLEES
Laura Murray-Tjan*
Hundreds of thousands of U.S. residents live in the country lawfully
and indefinitely but are not citizens. The rules governing the lives and free-
dom of these residents vary depending on their immigration status. This
Article explores the boundaries of and rules attaching to two such important
groups–resettled refugees and asylees–and explains why they must be
deemed (unconditionally) admitted under the Immigration and Nationality
Act. Whether a noncitizen is deemed “admitted” often determines whether
he or she will be deported–banished–from the United States. It also may
determine whether the noncitizen is subject to months or years of incarcera-
tion during resolution of her case, or while awaiting deportation. Perhaps
because of these populations’ relative indigence, which contributes to their
inability to access counsel, the case law in both the administrative and fed-
eral courts is strikingly confused and often misleading. For example, the
Board of Immigration Appeals has stated for decades that refugee admis-
sion is “conditional”–although that term appears nowhere in the relevant
statutory provisions. I analyze the historical trajectory of the concept of
admission as it relates to refugees and asylees to reach my conclusion that
they are (unconditionally) “admitted.” Today, as debates over immigration
reform continue to rage, it is particularly important to understand the con-
sequences of amendments relating to the grounds for detaining and deport-
ing persons deemed not “admitted,” and why refugees and asylees do not
fall into this category.
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INTRODUCTION
Hundreds of thousands of displaced persons have settled in the
United States since World War II. In general, the displaced have
gained immigration status through one of three mechanisms: (1) reset-
tlement as a refugee from overseas; (2) a grant of asylum in the United
States due to fears of persecution in the country of origin; and (3)
parole into the United States, whether for “humanitarian” reasons or in
the “public interest.”1 All three types of status were created before an
overhaul of immigration law in 19962 that rendered the question
whether a noncitizen had been “admitted”3 paramount to almost every
analysis of his or her substantive and procedural rights. The members
of Congress who drafted the foundational legislation establishing
these statuses could not have foreseen this long-term evolution in the
law, and the future consequences of precision (or a lack thereof) in
indicating whether such statuses amounted to “admission.”
The drafters of the 1996 statute—the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)4—were not focused on
the long-term displaced. Rather, Congress’ goal in emphasizing “ad-
mission” was to level the playing field between persons who had
slipped across the border without inspection and those who sought
status through legal channels.5 Previously, immigration law distin-
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2012). The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94
Stat. 102, was the landmark legislation that created a lasting framework for the reset-
tlement of refugees from overseas and the grant of asylum to refugees already in the
United States. The statutory parole authority was created in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188. The parole
power is now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012). In this Article, I employ
the term “displaced” to refer primarily to persons fleeing persecution in their countries
of origin. Thus, I do not specifically address the beneficiaries of Temporary Protected
Status (TPS), a status created by the Immigration Act of 1990 permitting persons
already in the United States to remain if their homelands were stricken by natural
disasters or armed conflict since their departure. See Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302, 104
Stat. 4978, 5030–36 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012)). Because persons from
certain countries, such as El Salvador and Sudan, have benefited from TPS for many
years, the term “temporary” is sometimes a misnomer. However, TPS has not gener-
ated the inconsistencies in statutory interpretation affecting resettled refugees and
asylees. On the contrary, it is well settled that TPS does not amount to an admission.
See, e.g., Sosa Ventura, 25 I&N Dec. 391, 392 (BIA 2010).
2. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 [hereinafter IIRIRA].
3. The statute defines “admitted” and “admission” as “the lawful entry of the alien
into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012).
4. See IIRIRA, supra note 2. R
5. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996); Legal Memorandum from
David Martin, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Request for Legal
Opinion: The Impact of the 1996 Act on Section 245(i) of the Act, to Michael L.
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guished between noncitizens who had “entered” the United States
whether lawfully or otherwise, and those who had not yet crossed the
border.6 After 1996, mere entry into the United States was no longer
the primary determinant of a noncitizen’s substantive and procedural
rights.
Following IIRIRA, the first question that any responsible immi-
gration attorney must address is whether a noncitizen has been “admit-
ted.” This question controls such crucial issues as the burden of proof
in removal proceedings, whether detention is statutorily mandated
over the course of proceedings, and whether indefinite detention fol-
lowing a removal order is constitutionally permissible.7 Otherwise
stated, whether (and on what date) a noncitizen is deemed “admitted”
often determines whether he or she will be deported—banished—from
the United States. It also may determine whether the noncitizen is sub-
ject to months or years of incarceration during resolution of his or her
case, or while awaiting deportation—or whether the noncitizen may
be released on bond or under an order of supervision.8 In short, nonci-
tizens deemed not admitted are in an inferior legal position, vulnerable
to deprivation of liberty and the reduction of procedural options
through the administrative, judicial, or legislative processes.
The concept of “admission” was deeply embedded in immigra-
tion law long before achieving its paramount position in 1996. Oddly,
however, congressional debates and conference reports on statutes re-
lating to the long-term displaced reveal frequent conflation of the
terms “parole,” “admission,” and “entry.”9 Because all three words
Aytes, Assistant Comm’r, Office of Benefits (Feb. 19, 1997), reprinted in 74 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 516, 520 (1997) [hereinafter Martin, Memorandum].
6. See Martin, Memorandum, supra note 5. R
7. See generally David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Pro-
tections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47,
64–126 (2001) [hereinafter Martin, Constitutional Protections] (discussing the rele-
vance of “admission” to the constitutionality of indefinite detention, including the
complex question whether IIRIRA affected the constitutional status of persons who
entered without inspection); cf. Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration
Regulation, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 165, 170–72 (2007) (arguing that IIRIRA stripped
away important constitutional protections from noncitizens who entered without in-
spection); RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 28, 36–38 (2d
ed. 2009) (“Persons seeking admission may not avail themselves of protections of the
Constitution.”). For a general examination of the applicability of constitutional protec-
tions to noncitizens, see David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same
Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367 (2003).
8. An order of supervision sets forth the conditions for release of a noncitizen
whom the government does not succeed in deporting within ninety days following a
removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (2012).
9. There are infinite examples of such errors. One notable instance is the titling of
a congressional hearing “Admission of Refugees on Parole” (emphases added). See
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were (and remain) distinct terms of art, they should not have been
employed interchangeably. Notwithstanding the tenet of statutory con-
struction that Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says,”10 legislators’ repeated misuse of the terms raises
the specter of mistaken application in at least some provisions, and has
eroded the terms’ mutual exclusivity.11
This terminological problem was exacerbated by the 1996 statu-
tory shift, because “Congress’ substitution of the term ‘admission,’ as
meaning a ‘lawful entry,’ for the previous definition of ‘entry’ as any
unrestrained crossing of the United States border, was not carefully or
thoughtfully accomplished.”12 The author of this comment, former
Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) member Lory Rosenberg, thus
criticized Congress’ inconsistent usage of the term “admission” in the
text of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) following the 1996
amendments.13 Apparently the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) agrees with Ms. Rosenberg. In a 2011 Board case, for example,
DHS went so far as to argue that “the admission concept has so many
applications and is used in so many different ways throughout the Act
that it would be futile for [the Board] to restrict its meaning by refer-
ence to [the statutory definition at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)] or any
other universal standard.”14 While the Board rejected DHS’s argu-
Admission of Refugees on Parole: Hearings on H.J. Res. 397 Before Subcomm. No. 1
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Admission of
Refugees on Parole Hearing]. In another example, a conference report relating to
Section 586 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, commonly known as the
Indochinese Parolee Adjustment Act, which allows parolees from Vietnam, Cambo-
dia, and Laos to adjust status to permanent residency, describes such persons as “law-
fully admitted” to the United States. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-997, at 106 (2000).
10. Arciniaga v. Gen. Motors, 460 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
11. Even the Supreme Court, in a foundational case on the constitutional rights of
noncitizens, has referred to parolees as “admitted” to the United States. Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (“Cuban parolees are . . . aliens who have been
admitted.”).
12. Rosas, 22 I&N Dec. 616, 625 (BIA 1999) (Rosenberg, Board Member, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
13. This lack of clarity has often required inquiry into the structure and design of
the statute as a whole or invocation of the “absurdity” doctrine to interpret certain
provisions. See, e.g., Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397, 403–06 (BIA 2011); Rosas, 22 I&N
Dec. at 618–23.
14. Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. at 403 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also Ilyce Shugall & Rebecca Desnoyers, Case Note: Orozco v. Mukasey: When
an Entry May Not Be an “Admission” and the Fundamental Problems with the Ninth
Circuit’s Analysis, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 68 (2008) (highlighting the complexity
of analyzing whether and when an “admission” has occurred).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\17-1\NYL102.txt unknown Seq: 6 19-MAR-14 13:30
42 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:37
ment, it did not quibble with DHS’s underlying complaint about the
law’s lack of clarity.15
Congress’ imprecise use of language when debating and crafting
the statutes relating to the displaced, combined with immigration
law’s shift in emphasis towards “admission” after 1996, has resulted
in strikingly confused case law and inconsistent DHS charging prac-
tices. In general, scholars, adjudicators and litigants have devoted in-
adequate attention to the concept of “admission” as it relates to the
displaced. Perhaps because of the relative indigence of these popula-
tions, and their difficulty accessing competent counsel, the courts have
not had the benefit of adequate, informed briefing fleshing out the
issues.16 They also have not compensated for the problem through
their own research and analyses.17 Rather, the courts often have com-
pounded the confusion. The inadequacy of immigration law jurispru-
dence, if not the focus of this Article, is certainly a leitmotif.18
As one example, the Board has stated inaccurately for decades
that refugees are only “conditionally” admitted—a concept that finds
no support in the INA. In the 2012 opinion Matter of D-K-,19 even as
the Board finally found refugees “admitted” for charging purposes,20
it adhered to the earlier characterization without explaining the impli-
cations for other aspects of immigration procedure. Moreover, al-
though the law has migrated over time towards deeming “asylum” an
admission, the Board in a 2013 case abruptly stated that it is not—
ignoring binding regulations, the Board’s own precedent, and agency
guidance characterizing “asylum” as an admission.21 The case law
also has struggled with the question whether, if asylum is an admis-
15. Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. at 404.
16. See, e.g., Sesay v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 74 F. App’x 84, 88 n.6
(2d Cir. 2003) (explicitly leaving open the question whether a grant of asylum equates
to an entry for a “fully briefed and properly argued” case); Robert A. Katzmann, The
Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 3, 8–9 (2008); Sam Dolnick, Improving Immigrant Access to Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2011, at A24.
17. See, e.g., cases cited infra Part III.B.3.
18. See, e.g., Lynne Marek, Posner Blasts Immigration Courts as “Inadequate”
and Ill-Trained, NAT’L L. J. (Apr. 22, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.nationallawjour
nal.com/id=900005509349 (detailing Circuit Judge Richard Posner’s harsh criticism
of Immigration Courts and the Board).
19. 25 I&N Dec. 761, 765–69 (BIA 2012).
20. In order to initiate removal proceedings, DHS charges noncitizens under the
grounds of inadmissibility or deportability in a document called a Notice to Appear.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012). Which grounds apply depend on whether the nonci-
tizen has been “admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2) (2012).
21. See V-X-, 26 I&N Dec. 147, 150–52 (BIA 2013).
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sion, an asylee who loses asylum status loses the “admission” that
came with it.22
In this Article, therefore, I seek to clear away the decades of fog
that obscure these issues and to explain why refugees and asylees23
must be deemed (unconditionally) admitted. The literature has not yet
examined these questions. Indeed, scholarly analysis of the concept of
“admission” remains very limited, despite its overriding importance in
immigration law and the many Board cases grappling with the term.24
Now is a particularly important time to start reversing this trend. Con-
gress continues to debate extensive reforms to immigration law, and
the import of some provisions undoubtedly will depend on a nonci-
tizen’s “admission” status.25 During the 2006 attempt to pass a bill
overhauling immigration law, the version of the Act that passed the
Senate included language easing the indefinite detention of certain
22. The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, which passed the Senate on June 27, 2013, would render this issue even more
important if the bill became law, because it creates a presumption that asylum should
be terminated if an asylee, even one who has obtained lawful permanent status, travels
to her home country. See S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3411 (as passed by the Senate, June
27, 2013). This provision was prompted by the return to Russia of one of the Boston
Marathon bombers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who already had adjusted to lawful perma-
nent residency from asylum status. See S. REP. NO. 113-40, at 52–53 (2013).
23. By contrast, noncitizens granted withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) are not deemed admitted. Cf. I-S- & C-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 432, 433–34
(BIA 2008) (observing that withholding of removal does not amount to a permanent
right to remain in the United States, and that Immigration Judges may not grant with-
holding of removal without first entering a removal order). Withholding is a form of
relief based on the same general criteria as asylum but with a higher burden of proof.
See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423–24
(1987).
24. Some exceptions are Elwin Griffith, The Meaning of Admission and the Effect
of Waivers Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 55 HOW. L.J. 1 (2011) (ex-
ploring the relevance of “admission” to eligibility for waivers of removability, but not
focusing on whether specific categories of noncitizens have been “admitted”); Shugall
& Desnoyers, supra note 14 (discussing the distinction between “entry” and “admis- R
sion” and its relevance to adjustment of status to lawful permanent residency); Elwin
Griffith, Admission and Cancellation of Removal Under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 979 (2005) (discussing the concept of admission as
it relates to cancellation of removal, a type of defense to deportation). Among the
most important cases addressing “admission” are Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA
2011), which overruled, in part, Shanu, 23 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 2005), and Rosas, 22
I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 1999). The federal courts of appeals also have grappled with the
concept. See, e.g., Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668, 672–74 (7th Cir. 2005);
Shivaraman v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1142, 1146–49 (9th Cir. 2004).
25. For example, a provision in the “SAFE” Act, introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives on June 6, 2013, would tighten the imposition of mandatory detention dur-
ing removal proceedings, which disproportionately affects inadmissible noncitizens.
See Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement Act, H.R. 2278, 113th Cong. § 301(b)(2)
(2013); see also infra Part II.B.2.
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classes of noncitizens deemed not admitted.26 Those proposals were
not unique to the 2006 Act, and Senators Grassley and Inhofe have
attempted to introduce such measures into current draft bills.27 Similar
immigration enforcement measures will continue to emerge as the
counterpoint to attempts at liberalization. It is high time to set the
record straight on the admission status of refugees and asylees—and
for the literature in general to focus more carefully on the “admission”
concept.
In Part I of this Article, I review the history of the statutes gov-
erning the long-term displaced, including the genesis of the 1952 pro-
vision codifying the parole authority, and the 1980 Refugee Act that
still forms the backbone of the refugee resettlement and asylum re-
gimes. In Part II, I examine the concept of “admission” and address its
increased relevance following the 1996 overhaul of much of immigra-
tion law. In Part III, I build on these discussions to explain why refu-
gees and asylees must be deemed (unconditionally) admitted.
I.
GENESIS OF THE FOUNDATIONAL REFUGEE STATUTES
Many authors have written expansive, informative histories of the
foundational parole and refugee statutes.28 The literature has focused
for the most part on the politics of refugee resettlement, analyzing
how the executive branch has decided which refugees to allow into the
United States, and the extent to which decision-making has been
driven by foreign policy as opposed to humanitarian concerns.29 By
26. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.
§ 206 (as passed by the Senate, May 25, 2006); see also infra Part II.C (discussing
Supreme Court precedent on indefinite detention and proposed bills that would super-
sede the Court’s decisions). Although the 2006 bill passed the Senate, it failed in the
House of Representatives.
27. See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
28. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 874–88 (5th ed. 2009); Kathryn M. Bockley, Com-
ment, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The Deception of Foreign Policy
in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 253 (1995); Ira J. Kurzban,
A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 867–69 (1982);
Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981); Marvin Samuel Gross,
Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma of the Indochina Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 175, 177–82 (1975). For insider reflections on passage of the Refugee Act of
1980, see David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, in 3 MICHI-
GAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES 91 (1982) [hereinafter Martin,
Refugee Act] and Edward M. Kennedy, The Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’L MIGRA-
TION REV. 141 (1981).
29. See, e.g., Anker & Posner, supra note 28, passim; Martin, Refugee Act, supra R
note 28, at 92–96, 104–09; cf. Daniel J. Steinbock, The Qualities of Mercy: Maximiz- R
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contrast, my goal is to examine the text and histories of the statutes to
discern how the concept of “admission” interrelates with refugee and
asylee status. Because a flurry of statutes was passed to address inter-
mittent humanitarian crises leading up to enactment of the most cru-
cial legislation—the Refugee Act of 1980—I also address several
other laws.
As my discussion will make apparent, refugee status has bounced
back and forth along a continuum between full-fledged admission as a
lawful permanent resident and resettlement on nominally temporary
parole. The statutes and practices immediately preceding passage of
the Refugee Act of 1980, however, made refugee status inherently
precarious. This appears to have engendered a legal mindset that read
conditionality into refugee admission status that was not spelled out in
the Act. I will discuss these interpretive irregularities in Part III, fol-
lowing my exposition of the history of the Act in this Part and the
significance of “admission” to a noncitizen’s substantive and procedu-
ral rights in Part II.
A. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948
The Displaced Persons Act30 was the first major post-war legisla-
tion allowing for the systematic resettlement of refugees in the United
States.31 The statute assisted Europeans who had fled fascist or com-
munist regimes during or at the close of World War II.32 For this nar-
rowly demarcated group of persons, the Act accorded a tremendous
benefit upon resettlement—lawful permanent residency—and thus
any refugee resettled under the Act was indisputably “admitted.”33
This beneficence would be repeated in subsequent, similarly selective
laws during the 1950s, but would disappear permanently by 1960.34
ing the Impact of U.S. Refugee Resettlement, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 951 passim
(2003) (analyzing refugee selection grounds).
30. Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
31. See Anker & Posner, supra note 28, at 13. Note that limited executive and R
administrative measures provided for resettlement prior to and during the war, before
the magnitude of the displaced population forced the United States to develop more
expansive strategies. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 28, at 876–77 (citing R
and quoting ROBERT A. DIVINE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-1952, at
110–12 (1957)); see also Edwin B. Silverman, Indochina Legacy: The Refugee Act of
1980, 10 PUBLIUS 27, 28 (1980) (addressing the Truman Directive of Dec. 22, 1945).
32. See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. 80-774, §2(c), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009.
33. See id. §4(a). Note that lawful permanent residency is referred to colloquially as
a “green card.” See, e.g., Laura Danielson & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Introduction to
SAUNDRA AMRHEIN, GREEN CARD STORIES 9, 10 (2011).
34. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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B. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952: Codification
of the Parole Authority
The Immigration Act of 1952 introduced the first provision codi-
fying the Attorney General’s parole authority. However, Congress did
not cut the concept of parole from whole cloth. Before the Act’s pas-
sage, there existed a non-statutory administrative practice of “parol-
ing” otherwise excludable noncitizens to avoid holding them in
custody pending their deportation, or for specific purposes such as
prosecution or testifying in criminal cases.35 At bottom, “parole”
equated to temporary release from immigration detention.36 The text
and history of the 1952 provision indicate that it was not intended as a
large-scale mechanism for mass refugee resettlement. Because it sub-
sequently was used that way, however, the inherently tenuous nature
of parole engendered lasting confusion as to the nature of refugee “ad-
mission,” confusion that has continued into the twenty-first century.
Under Congress’ draft provision prior to comments from the At-
torney General’s office, the purpose of parole remained the temporary
release into the United States of otherwise excludable noncitizens.37
However, parole was available only to noncitizens requiring medical
care. Following treatment, the parolee was to “be deported in the same
manner as other aliens who are excluded from the United States.”38
A congressional committee requested comments from the Attor-
ney General.39 In a written statement, Deputy Attorney General Pey-
ton Ford suggested substituting the following language, explaining
that the “modification[s] . . . would more likely be efficacious in the
administration of the law”:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for
emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public inter-
est any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such
parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the
alien and when the purposes of such parole have been served the
35. Gross, supra note 28, at 177. Professor David A. Martin and Senator Patrick R
Leahy both have advocated for admitting refugees as lawful permanent residents
again. See DAVID A. MARTIN, THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM:
REFORMS FOR A NEW ERA OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 110–11(2005); Leahy-Levin
Refugee Protection Act, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 14 (2010).
36. See Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 189–90 (1958).
37. See Anker & Posner, supra note 28, at 15. R
38. S. 716, 82d Cong. § 212(d)(5) (1951). The House bill contained identical lan-
guage. H.R. 2816, 82d Cong. § 212(d)(5) (1951).
39. See Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws: Joint Hear-
ings on S. 716, H.R. 2379 and H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong. 711 (1951) (statement of Peyton Ford, Deputy Att’y Gen.).
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alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from
which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be
dealt with in the same manner as that of any applicant for admis-
sion to the United States.40
Congress adopted the suggested changes wholesale.41 In ac-
cepting the proposed modifications, the Joint Committee observed:
The provision in the instant bill represents an acceptance of the
recommendation of the Attorney General with reference to this
form of discretionary relief. The committee believes that the
broader discretionary authority is necessary to permit the Attorney
General to parole inadmissible aliens into the United States in
emergency cases, such as the case of an alien who requires imme-
diate medical attention before there has been an opportunity for an
immigration officer to inspect him, and in cases where it is strictly
in the public interest to have an inadmissible alien present in the
United States, such as, for instance, a witness or for purposes of
prosecution.42
In other words, Congress expected that the provision would apply
to individual, inadmissible noncitizens whom immigration officers did
not have the opportunity to inspect and who were either in the United
States temporarily or for a specific purpose. The provision was not
designed to effectuate the broad-scale, permanent resettlement of large
groups of refugees.43
40. Id. at 713. Today, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) reads as follows:
The Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a
case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such
parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and
when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned
to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall
continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other appli-
cant for admission to the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012). For a discussion of the general uses of parole today,
see David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal
and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167,
179–80 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/12/20/martin.html.
41. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(d)(5), 66
Stat. 163, 188.
42. H.R. REP. NO. 1365, at 1743 (1952) (emphases added); see also S. REP. NO.
1137, at 1116–17 (1952) (stating same).
43. In congressional hearings on the Fair Share Act of 1960, Congressman Feighan,
one of the drafters of the parole provision, dispelled any doubts:
I just want the record to show that I believe the parolee section of our
permanent immigration law should not be used on a permanent basis. It
was set up in the first instance strictly on the basis of a provision for an
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\17-1\NYL102.txt unknown Seq: 12 19-MAR-14 13:30
48 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:37
Nonetheless, our Commanders in Chief subsequently employed
the provision for just that purpose. Eisenhower was the first president
to authorize the parole of a large group of refugees, resettling 15,000
Hungarians in 1956 in the wake of Hungary’s failed revolution.44 This
set the precedent for the executive branch’s parole of hundreds of
thousands of Cuban refugees during the 1960s and 1970s.45 President
Kennedy in 1962 authorized the parole of a large group of ethnic Chi-
nese who had been expelled from mainland China.46 President Ford,
after the fall of Saigon in April 1975, employed the parole provision to
allow 130,000 refugees from Vietnam into the United States.47 By
1979, more than 200,000 Indochinese had received parole.48
As Professor David A. Martin has insightfully observed, although
the statute “speaks of parole as temporary permission to cross US bor-
ders . . . [the Indochinese refugees] were undeniably coming for a
permanent stay.”49 In other words, there was no pretense that “parole”
was being employed as prescribed by the statutory text. The execu-
tive’s repeated invocation of the parole power generated tensions with
some members of Congress, who later specifically sought to limit the
use of parole in the Refugee Act of 1980.50
C. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953
The counterpoint to the executive’s use of the parole power was
Congress’ passage of statutes that were too limited in scope and time
frame to accommodate repeated humanitarian emergencies. Following
the Displaced Persons Act, the next major legislation was the Refugee
Relief Act of 1953.51 The Act allowed 205,000 refugees to resettle in
the United States, primarily persons from communist-dominated re-
gions in Europe, but also from the Middle and Far East.52 Like the
1948 Displaced Persons Act, the statute was a short-term exception to
emergency. At that time the idea of an emergency in the minds of the
Joint Committee on Immigration . . . was no more than, as a maximum,
4,000 that probably would be the number on a ship in distress, such as the
Andrea Doria which subsequently was sunk.
Admission of Refugees on Parole Hearing, supra note 9, at 45. R
44. Kurzban, supra note 28, at 870–71. R
45. Martin, Refugee Act, supra note 28, at 94; Gross, supra note 28, at 180. R
46. Gross, supra note 28, at 180. R
47. Id. at 182.
48. Kurzban, supra note 28, at 872. R
49. Martin, Refugee Act, supra note 28, at 93. R
50. See Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(f)(3), 94 Stat. 102, 108.
51. Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400.
52. Id. §§ 3–4.
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the United States’ normal immigration policy, a temporary layering on
of refugee admissions.53
Most importantly for our purposes, it was the last major piece of
legislation to allow refugees to enter the United States on immigrant
visas—i.e., as lawful permanent residents.
D. The Fair Share Act of 1960
The Fair Share Act54 marked a turning point in the history of
refugee resettlement: For the first time, Congress specifically legis-
lated for resettlement via parole. In its preamble, the Act states:
[Congress resolves that] under the terms of section 212(d)(5) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of [1952] the Attorney General
may parole into the United States . . . an alien refugee-escapee . . .
if such alien (1) applies for parole while physically present within
the limits of any country which is not Communist, Communist-
dominated, or Communist occupied, (2) is not a national of the area
in which the application is made, and (3) is within the mandate of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.55
The Act’s purpose was to provide a mechanism for the United
States to accommodate its “fair share” of the refugees displaced by
World War II remaining in European refugee camps under the juris-
diction of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.56
Perhaps because of this novel application of the parole power, the
legislative history of the Act reveals striking imprecision in the use of
crucial legal terms—the most glaring of which may be the titling of
congressional hearings on the Act “Admission of Refugees on Pa-
role.” There are many additional examples of conflation of the terms
“parole” and “admission” by members of Congress and prominent
witnesses. For example, the commentary by the Department of State
on the Act references the “admission” of refugees “under the terms of
section 212(d)(5) . . . and under parole.”57 One of the bill’s chief ar-
chitects, Congressman Walter, presented an article by a “prominent
expert,” Albert E. Reitzel, formerly Assistant General Counsel to the
Immigration and Nationality Service (INS).58 In his article, Mr.
53. Silverman, supra note 31, at 28. R
54. Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (1960).
55. Id. § 1 (emphases added).
56. S. REP. NO. 86-1651, at 5–7 (1960); 106 CONG. REC. 7259–60, 7265 (1960)
(discussing the purposes of H.R.J. Res. 397 and announcing its passage).
57. S. REP. NO. 86-1651, at 19 (emphases added).
58. Admission of Refugees on Parole Hearing, supra note 9, at 47. Until 2003, the R
Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) was the principal agency charged with
administering the immigration laws. In 2003, the INS was abolished and most of its
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Reitzel referred interchangeably to refugees’ being “admitted” and
“paroled.”59 Apparently, explicit legislation for the parole of refugees
was generating some cognitive dissonance.
The Act required paroled refugees to apply for adjustment of sta-
tus after two years’ presence in the United States.60 The Senate Report
accompanying the bill provides a glimpse into the rationale for scrap-
ping the admission of refugees as lawful permanent residents. Accord-
ing to the report, the two-year period allowed for “additional scrutiny,
screening, and investigation” prior to refugees’ reaching the milestone
of permanent residency, which would place them closer to the endg-
ame of citizenship.61 Congressman Walter, one of the chief architects
of the bill, also made clear during congressional hearings that he did
not trust the overseas screening process and wished investigation to
continue even after refugees landed in the United States.62
Importantly, the Fair Share Act was the point in immigration law
history where refugee resettlement was statutorily linked to a condi-
tional status that easily could be terminated, and refugees correspond-
ingly expelled. Notwithstanding subsequent amendments to the INA
and a changed juridical landscape, the vestiges of these concepts still
permeate adjudicators’ decision-making, decades later.
E. The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act:
Creation of the “Seventh Preference” Category
The 1965 Amendments63 were the first large-scale modification
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.64 The amendments
revamped the way the United States ordered its choices in admitting
noncitizens, moving from a national origin based quota system to a
series of “preference categories.”65 The preference categories gave
priority to family members of citizens and lawful permanent residents,
responsibilities were transferred to the newly created Department of Homeland Secur-
ity. See DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY 76 n.3
(2007).
59. Admission of Refugees on Parole Hearing, supra note 9, at 47–51. R
60. §§ 3–4, 74 Stat. at 505.
61. S. REP. NO. 86-1651, at 26.
62. Admission of Refugees on Parole Hearing, supra note 9, at 56. R
63. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
64. Gross, supra note 28, at 181. R
65. According to Senator Kennedy, the changes were “based upon the fundamental
belief that in our immigration policy we should put a high premium on keeping fami-
lies together.” 111 CONG. REC. 24,775 (1965).
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and to persons with skills useful to the United States.66 Refugees were
set as the last preference category—the seventh preference.67
Unlike noncitizens in the other preference categories, refugees
did not receive immigrant visas upon resettlement. Rather, they ar-
rived in the United States as “conditional entrants.”68 Both the Senate
and House Committees on the Judiciary, in their respective reports,
explained why the label “parole” in the Fair Share Act was traded for
“conditional entry” in the 1965 Amendments:
The conditional entry of refugees as proposed in this bill is not
unlike the parole procedure utilized during the existence of the so-
called Fair Share Act (sec. 212(d)(5)) and it is intended that the
procedure remain the same. Since the use of the term “parole” con-
veys a connotation unfavorable to the alien, the substitute term
“conditional entry” has been used to avoid any such implication.69
Elsewhere, the report specifically focuses on how to label refu-
gees’ manner of “entry,” but nonetheless incorrectly references “refu-
gees already admitted to the United States under [the] provisions” of
the Fair Share Act—which of course allowed for resettlement via pa-
role.70 Doubtless the drafters of the 1965 Amendments were well
aware that refugees were not “admitted” for permanent residency via
the seventh preference category, or under the Fair Share Act for that
matter. Nonetheless, the misuse of terms of art that started with the
passage of the Fair Share Act heralded the remarkable imprecision
that later would permeate the drafting history of the Refugee Act of
1980—and ultimately find its way into the case law.
As in the Fair Share Act, the 1965 Amendments required refu-
gees to apply for adjustment of status after two years’ presence in the
United States.71 Lawful permanent residency was granted if a refugee
was deemed “admissible as an immigrant at the time of inspection and
examination” by an immigration officer.72 By this point in history, the
concept of refugee status as conditional, with a waiting period preced-
ing adjustment of status to permanent residency, was deeply implanted
in the legal framework surrounding refugee resettlement.
66. 111 CONG. REC. 24,775 (statements of Sen. Kennedy and Sen. Holland). 
67. Sec. 3, § 203(a), 79 Stat. at 912–13.
68. Id.
69. H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 15 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 16–17 (1965).
70. H.R. REP. No. 89-745, at 15; S. REP. No. 89-748, at 17.
71. Sec 3, § 203(g), 79 Stat. at 914.
72. Id. sec. 3, § 203(h).
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F. The Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980 was a tremendous accomplishment,
with a legislative history revealing untold hours of labor by members
of Congress, executive branch officials, and witnesses from around the
nation. Its immediate motivating factors included curbing the execu-
tive’s unfettered use of the parole power73 and creating a systematic
resettlement process with sufficient allocations to replace the “patch-
work of different programs that [had] evolved in response to specific
crises.”74 The Act also introduced the first statutory provision for
granting asylum to persons already in the United States who met the
definition of “refugee.”75
I will commence my discussion of the Refugee Act by tracing the
concept of admission as it appeared in predecessor bills, and in the
final enactment. Then, I will examine the discussions in each house of
Congress in an effort to discern why the bill evolved as it did. Addi-
tionally, I will present commentary by members of Congress and key
witnesses that illustrates a lack of clarity about key legal terms–which
may help explain the lack of clarity in the final bill and subsequent
case law.
73. Kennedy, supra note 28, at 143–44, 146. R
74. The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 643 Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 96th Cong. at 9 (1979) (statement of Dick Clark, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee
Affairs).
75. S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 9 (1979). The INA of 1952 had provided for withholding
of deportation only. See Arthur Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act:
An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 243, 244–45 (1984). The standard
for granting withholding—showing a clear probability of persecution—was very
stringently applied. See id. Withholding was preserved as a defense to deportation in
the Refugee Act of 1980, with modifications “to conform the language of that section
to the Convention [on Refugees].” H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 18 (1979). There was no
statutory provision for asylum applications, only a regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 108 issued
pursuant to former INA § 103. See id. at 17. Since passage of the Refugee Act, asylee
status has been available to persons physically present in the United States who meet
the same definition of refugee applied to persons resettling from overseas. The Act
defined “refugee” as
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion[.]
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 201, § 101(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102, 102
(1980).
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1. Draft Bill Introduced to Congress by Senator Kennedy and
Congressman Rodino
The draft bill76 introduced in both houses of Congress in 1979
provided for the resettlement of two classes of refugees. “Normal
flow” refugees were to be admitted to the United States as lawful per-
manent residents.77 The bill placed a ceiling of 50,000 on such admis-
sions.78 Provision was also made for so-called “emergency situation”
refugees who could be resettled above and beyond the 50,000 ceiling
in the event of an “unforeseen emergency refugee situation.”79 This
class of refugees was to be “conditionally admitted” rather than admit-
ted to permanent residency, and was required to submit to inspection
for adjustment of status after two years’ presence in the United
States.80 The bill had no asylum provision.
After introduction in both houses of Congress, the bill traveled to
their respective Committees on the Judiciary. By the time the bill was
referred back to each chamber for a vote, significant differences had
emerged.
2. Senate Version
The Senate version of the bill, passed on September 6, 1979,81
provided that emergency situation refugees would arrive either as law-
ful permanent residents or as “conditional” admittees at the discretion
of the Attorney General.82 Conditionally admitted refugees were re-
quired to apply for adjustment of status after two years’ presence.83
Senator Kennedy indicated that any conditionally admitted refugee
who was denied permanent residency would be subject to “exclusion
proceedings,” although the bill did not explicitly state this.84 Ken-
nedy’s explanation seems to render “admission” a misnomer, because
exclusion proceedings historically applied only to persons never ad-
mitted to the United States. On the other hand, it is unclear how mean-
ingful Kennedy’s use of the term “exclusion” was, given Congress’
imprecision with immigration terms over the course of the drafting
history.
76. S. 643, 96th Cong. (as introduced by Sen. Kennedy, Mar. 13, 1979); H.R. 2816,
96th Cong. (as introduced by Rep. Rodino and Rep. Holtzman, Mar. 13, 1979).
77. S. 643 § 201(b); H.R. 2816 § 201(b).
78. S. 643 § 201(b); H.R. 2816 § 201(b).
79. S. 643 § 201(b); H.R. 2816 § 201(b).
80. S. 643 § 201(b); H.R. 2816 § 201(b).
81. 125 CONG. REC. 23,252 (1979).
82. S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 27 (1979).
83. Id. at 27–28.
84. S. REP. 96-256, at 16.
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Another important change to the initial draft bill related to asy-
lum. Under the Senate bill, those persons already in the United States
who met the definition of “refugee” were eligible for asylum.85 The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary described asylum as a “conditional
admission status”86 and stated in its report that “The bill . . . makes
clear that the Attorney General may terminate the conditional admis-
sion status [of an asylee] if conditions change in the individual’s home
country so that he would no longer be subject to persecution upon
return.”87
Thus, the term “conditional admission” under the Senate bill
meant two different things, depending on whether it related to asylees
or refugees. Emergency situation refugees who were “conditionally
admitted” could be “excluded” if later denied adjustment of status,
suggesting that “admission” was conditioned on a future ability to ad-
just. The “conditional admission” conferred by a grant of asylum, on
the other hand, was terminable if conditions changed in the country of
origin.
Perhaps in an effort to build consensus, the Senate tried to paint
“conditional admission status” not as something new, but as a continu-
ation of concepts already part of the then-existing statutory scheme.
Thus, the committee report stated that “conditional admission status”
would be “equivalent in most respects to that provided under current
law to refugees admitted under present section 203(a)(7) or under this
bill’s proposed section 208 [addressing emergency situation refu-
gees].”88 This characterization, however, incorrectly termed condi-
tional entry via the seventh preference category in § 203(a)(7) an
admission, even though “conditional entry” was designed to be
equivalent to the parole status accorded refugees in the Fair Share
Act.89 Thus, by the time this version of the bill appeared, the concepts
of parole, entry, and admission were slipping towards convergence.
85. Id.
86. Id. (“Paragraph (2) provides that persons granted asylum shall be placed into a
conditional admission status . . . .”).
87. Id. at 9. Asylees were permitted to apply for adjustment of status after two
years’ presence–but could not adjust “[i]f conditions ha[d] changed in the refugee’s
home country so that he would no longer be subject to persecution upon return.” Id.
The bill did not specify what would happen to asylees denied adjustment of sta-
tus–whether they would be placed in proceedings, and if so, whether exclusion or
deportation–and the report did not fill this textual gap.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. See discussion supra Part I.E.
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3. House Version
The House version of the bill, passed on December 20, 1979,90
also introduced some notable changes. Like the Senate, the House in-
serted a provision for granting asylum.91 The House likewise provided
that asylum could be terminated due to changed circumstances in the
country of origin.92 However, the House bill did not refer to asylum
status as a “conditional admission” or any other type of “admission”—
it cited only the “grant” of asylum.93
The more significant variation from the Senate version was the
House’s treatment of resettled refugees. Under the House’s version, no
refugee, whether normal flow or emergency situation, would be admit-
ted as a lawful permanent resident.94 The House further diverged from
the Senate insofar as it nowhere employed the language “conditional
admission.” Rather, the House referred throughout the bill to refugee
“admission.”95 Under the House version, all refugees were required to
submit to examination for adjustment of status after two years’ pres-
ence in the United States. The House crafted an entirely new provision
stating that refugee status could be terminated upon a finding that the
noncitizen was not a refugee at the time of admission.96
90. See 125 CONG. REC. 37,242 (1979).
91. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 44 (1979).
92. See id.
93. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 44 (setting forth § 208 of the proposed codification).
Under § 208(a), “[t]he Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physi-
cally present in the United States . . . to apply for asylum, and the alien may be
granted asylum . . . if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee.”
Id. Under § 208(b), “[a]sylum . . . may be terminated if the Attorney General . . .
determines that the alien is no longer a refugee . . . owing to a change in circum-
stances in the alien’s country of nationality or, in the case of an alien having no
nationality, in the country in which the alien last habitually resided.” Id.
94. Id. at 16. According to the House Committee on the Judiciary committee report,
this decision was driven in substantial part by Attorney General Bell’s unwillingness
to represent that “someone is not slipping through [the overseas screening process]
that should not.” Id. at 17. Deputy Associate Attorney General Doris Meissner, on the
other hand, opined that normal flow refugees should be allowed lawful permanent
residency upon arrival, as “[w]e screen these people with the same procedures that we
screen intending immigrants.” The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the Comm. of Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong.
75 (1979) (statement of Doris Meissner, Deputy Associate Att’y Gen.).
95. See 125 CONG. REC. 37,242–247 (1979).
96. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 43. Section 207(c)(4) of the proposed codification
provides: “The refugee status of any alien . . . may be terminated . . . if the Attorney
General determines that the alien was not in fact a refugee . . . at the time of the
alien’s admission.”
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4. Final Version: The Refugee Act of 1980
After passage in the two houses of Congress, the bill proceeded
to conference. Once it emerged, the bill contained the language (or
lack thereof) relating to admission from the House’s draft, and no ref-
ugee was to be resettled as a lawful permanent resident. In an apparent
compromise, however, the waiting period to apply for adjustment of
status was reduced across the board from two years to one. Thus,
under the final version of the Refugee Act:
• Neither normal flow nor emergency situation refugees entered
as lawful permanent residents;97
• Throughout the bill, the term “admission” was used to describe
refugees’ manner of resettling in the United States, and it was
nowhere modified by the term “conditional”;98
• Refugee status was terminable upon a finding that the nonci-
tizen did not meet the definition of “refugee” at the time of
“admission”;99
• Refugees were required to submit to examination for perma-
nent residency after one year’s presence in the United States;100
• Asylum was referred to merely as a “grant,” and neither an
“admission” nor a “conditional admission”;101
• Asylee status could be terminated if the noncitizen no longer
met the definition of “refugee” due to changed circumstances
in the country of origin;102 and
• Asylees had the option of applying for adjustment of status af-
ter one year’s presence in the United States, with no indication
of the consequences of denial.103
Thus, the word “conditional” had been deleted entirely from the
bill, appearing nowhere as a modifier for “admission.” With respect to
refugees, the text of the statute made their status “conditional” only
insofar as it was revocable upon a finding that they were not refugees
at the time of arrival.
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference
described the Senate/House compromise as follows:
97. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 201(b), §§ 207–209, 94 Stat.
102, 103–06 (1980).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
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Admission Status of Refugees
The Senate Bill provided that refugees entering the United
States under normal flow or additions to normal flow procedures
would be admitted as lawful permanent residents. Those entering in
emergency situations would be admitted conditionally or as lawful
permanent residents in the discretion of the Attorney General.
The House amendment provided that all refugees entering the
United States be admitted conditionally as ‘refugees’ with retroac-
tive adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents after two
years.
The Conference substitute adopts the House version with ad-
justment of status permitted after a period of one year. It is the
intent of the Conferees, in creating this new “refugee” status, that
such individuals not be subjected to employment
discrimination[.]104
I have been unable to find any indication in the written record
why the term “conditional” disappeared from the final version of the
statute, when the above explanation directly stated that refugee admis-
sion was conditional. Whatever the reason, the clear language of the
text to the effect that all refugees are “admitted” trumps any discus-
sion buried deep in the annals of legislative history.105 Refugees could
lose status if they were not in fact refugees at the time of resettlement.
Asylees could lose status if there was no longer a risk of persecution
in the country of origin. To the extent that conditionality was indicated
in the Act’s final version, it was in these two provisions only.
This type of conditionality for refugees would have been logical
in light of Deputy Associate Attorney General Doris Meissner’s expla-
nation for the inclusion of a waiting period in prior statutes. As Meiss-
ner noted, the rationale behind giving refugees a second look before
granting permanent residency was the concern that “refugees were
coming largely from Communist countries, and there was a question
of higher risk attached to those people.”106 In other words, there was a
concern that Communist spies or plants might enter the United States
under the guise of refugees. Such persons would not in fact be refu-
104. H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 21 (1980) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 96-590, at 21
(1980) (Conf. Rep.).
105. The highly learned Professor David A. Martin, who was involved in some as-
pects of drafting the bill, has no specific recollection of why the term was omitted.
One theory is that the term was deleted to gain consensus from Senate conferees on
the one-year waiting period. See email from David A. Martin, Professor, Univ. of Va.
Sch. of Law, to author (July 26, 2013) (on file with author).
106. The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l
Operations of the Comm. of Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 75 (1979) (statement of Do-
ris Meissner, Deputy Associate Att’y Gen.).
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gees at the time of admission, and under the statute therefore could
lose refugee status. This suggests that the conditionality of refugee
admission was never intended to render refugee status tenuous and
inherently impermanent. Rather, it was designed to address specific
foreign policy and national security concerns.
5. Key Actors’ Casual Use of Terms of Art
The examples of conflation of “admission,” “entry,” and “parole”
over the course of the bill’s drafting history are far too numerous to
list. Conflation was more the rule than the exception. Members of
Congress, representatives from the Attorney General’s office, and
other actors referred to refugee resettlement as “admission” regardless
of whether it occurred via parole, conditional entry, or an immigrant
visa (lawful permanent residency). The following examples illustrate
the casual use of crucial terminology:
• Associate Attorney General Michael J. Egan in a prepared
statement repeatedly referred to the “admission” of refugees
through “conditional entry” or the “exercise of parole
power.”107
• Attorney General Griffin Bell in prepared testimony before the
House Committee on the Judiciary observed: “Under the cur-
rent law, the Attorney General has the sole authority . . . for the
admission of refugees, either through the conditional entry pro-
visions or the exercise of the parole power. The number of ref-
ugees admitted through use of the parole power ha[s] become
far greater than was contemplated by Congress.”108
• Doris Meissner, Deputy Associate Attorney General, referred
to “conditional entrants” as “admit” or “admission” under the
1965 Amendments.109
• Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, a co-sponsor of the Ref-
ugee Act, indicated that the House’s final version of the bill
provided “set procedures for [refugee] admission”—notwith-
107. See The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 643 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 18–19 (1979) (prepared statement of Michael J. Egan, Associ-
ate Att’y Gen.).
108. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 11 (1979) (emphasis added). The Attorney General
made identical statements in written testimony before the House of Representatives.
The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 20 (1979)
(statement of Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen.).
109. The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l
Operations of the Comm. of Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 66 (1979) (statement of Do-
ris Meissner, Deputy Assoc. Att’y Gen.).
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standing that she was a key proponent of retaining a form of
“conditional entry” and discarding the possibility of admitting
refugees as lawful permanent residents.110 Throughout the De-
cember 13, 1979 final hearing on the House bill,111 Congress-
woman Holtzman consistently referred to the “admission” of
normal flow and emergency situation refugees under the pro-
posed law—never once appending the term “conditional.”
• Congressman Rodino, a co-sponsor of the Refugee Act, re-
ferred to the “admission” of refugees under the 1965 Amend-
ments and under the Attorney General’s parole authority.112
• Similarly, Senator Kennedy, the bill’s chief sponsor, in
presenting the bill upon its emergence from the Committee on
the Judiciary, referred to the “current [refugee] admission poli-
cies” under the 1965 Amendments, which of course allowed
only for conditional entry.113
• The report from the House’s Committee on the Judiciary indi-
cated that adjustment of status was available for resettled refu-
gees whose “entry” had not been terminated by the Attorney
General—as opposed to their “admission” or “conditional
admission.”114
• That report repeatedly referenced the “admission” of refugees
on parole in reciting the history of refugee resettlement after
World War II.115
In sum, usage of the term “admission” was very casual over the
course of the Refugee Act’s drafting. Even those participants who
should have been best informed—for example, witnesses from the At-
torney General’s office—employed crucial terms interchangeably,
even in prepared statements.
This casual use of language made its way into an article pub-
lished by Senator Kennedy not long after passage of the Act. In his
110. See 125 CONG. REC. 35,813–14 (1979); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 16-
17 (1979).
111. Id. at 35,813–15.
112. Id. at 35,816.
113. In Congressman Rodino’s lengthy, apparently prepared, testimony on the U.S.
postwar programs “providing for the admission of refugees,” he applied the term “ad-
mission” to all refugees whether they were resettled via parole, conditional entry, or
as lawful permanent residents. 125 CONG. REC. 35,816 (1979) (emphasis added).
114. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 18 (1979).
115. “Since World War II, provision has been made for the admission of refugees
into the United States under a series of ad hoc legislative and administrative authori-
zations. Even today, 14 years after the development of a permanent statutory provi-
sion for the admission of refugees, the majority of refugees continue to be admitted
outside the regular procedure established by statute.” Id. at 2 (emphases added).
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article, Kennedy describes the main differences between the Senate
and House versions of the bill—and thus the main areas for resolution
by the Conference Committee:
Admission Status of Refugees
The Senate bill ended years of admitting refugees as “condi-
tional entrants” or “parolees.” Instead, it treated refugees like other
immigrants, as permanent resident aliens. However, the conferees
concluded that a one year “conditional entry” status as a “refugee”
would be desirable until the new system and procedures under the
Act were implemented. Therefore, the conferees established a new
admission status for refugees, different from the previous “condi-
tional entry” or “parolee” status. The new status would end after
one year, after which the refugee could adjust to permanent resident
status. The one year status would be counted in the five year period
required for naturalization.116
In this excerpt, Kennedy says that “refugee admission” status is
simultaneously the same as and different from “conditional entry.”
This could mean that refugee status is the same insofar as it is not
admission as a lawful permanent resident, and that it is different inso-
far as it amounts to an “admission” rather than mere conditional entry.
But Kennedy does not elucidate the point.117 Nor does he explain the
deletion of the modifier “conditional” from the Refugee Act of 1980,
which contradicts his own commentary.
The confusion surrounding the admission statutes of resettled ref-
uges has endured for decades. Adjudicators repeatedly missed the op-
portunity to reconsider and clarify the issue,118 even after a statutory
definition of “admission” was codified in IIRIRA. Who is to blame?
Senator Kennedy, for his after-the-fact article discussing concepts no-
116. Kennedy, supra note 28, at 150 (emphases added). Most of the language ap- R
pears to have been drawn from a statement Kennedy made in Congress when present-
ing the conference report. See 126 CONG. REC. 3757 (1980).
117. I have not located any subsequent authority that clarifies Kennedy’s
commentary.
118. See, e.g., Chan v. Kane, CIV No. 11-01166, 2011 WL 2200020, at *1 (D. Ariz.
May 5, 2011) (incorrectly stating that a resettled refugee had been “paroled” into the
United States); Thao Lee, A028 009 671, 2009 WL 2437133, at *1 (BIA July 28,
2009) (holding that a refugee was “paroled” into the United States as an “arriving
alien” rather than “admitted”); Radenko Spiric, A079 848 824, 2007 WL 275768, at
*2 (BIA Jan. 17, 2007) (holding that a refugee was an “arriving alien”); Martin Gama,
A071 661 790, 2005 WL 3833029, at *1 (BIA Nov. 16, 2005) (holding that a refugee
was “conditionally admitted” and thus subject to the grounds of deportability); see
also Omanovic v. Crawford, No. CV 06-0208-PHX, 2006 WL 2256630, at *5 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 7, 2006) (engaging in a bewildering analysis to find an alien’s refugee
status to be “conditional” but that the “conditional” nature of his admission was “sev-
ered” due to criminal convictions).
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where extant in the bill? The Board of Immigration Appeals, for read-
ing terms into the statute that simply were not there?119 Or was the
problem intellectual inertia—i.e., was it caused by old assumptions
held by attorneys and adjudicators, in whose minds the conditional
nature of refugee resettlement was deeply implanted?
As to the admission status of asylees, regulations, case law, and
agency guidance seemed to move towards treating asylum as an ad-
mission until 2013, when the Board held in Matter of V-X- that a grant
of asylum was not an admission.120 I will explore these issues in more
detail in Part III. Before turning to them, however, I shall address why
it matters to each and every noncitizen whether her mode of arrival in
this country is deemed an “admission.”
II.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “ADMISSION”
A noncitizen’s “admission” status is fundamental to his or her
procedural options and constitutional standing. First, it determines
whether the noncitizen is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility or
deportability in removal proceedings. Generally speaking, the latter
are far more favorable to noncitizens. A noncitizen’s admission status
also may control whether she is eligible for bond or subject to
mandatory detention over the course of proceedings, including during
any government appeal of a victory by the noncitizen at trial. Even
more sobering, whether a noncitizen is deemed “admitted” may be
decisive as to whether she possesses any constitutional right to be re-
leased from detention following a removal order—or may be incarcer-
ated indefinitely. Finally, whether and when a noncitizen has been
“admitted” can determine whether she is eligible for a defense to re-
moval or is removable at all.121 As we shall see, however, “admission”
is not a unitary concept, and continues to be molded and shaped by the
case law even following the codification of a definition in IIRIRA in
1996.
A. The Evolving Concept of “Admission”
Until IIRIRA’s passage in 1996, “entry” carried the procedural
significance held by “admission” today. Under former 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13), “entry” meant “any coming of an alien into the United
States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession,
119. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
120. 26 I&N Dec. 147, 147 (BIA 2013).
121. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
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whether voluntarily or otherwise.”122 In the 1973 case Matter of
Pierre,123 the Board interpreted “entry” as
(1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States . . . plus
(2) inspection and admission by an immigration officer . . . ; or (3)
actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspec-
tion point . . . ; coupled with (4) freedom from restraint[.]124
A hard line was drawn between persons who had “entered” the
United States and those who had not. Noncitizens who had not yet
“entered” were subject to the grounds of excludability.125 Noncitizens
who had achieved entry were subject to the grounds of de-
portability.126 Deportation proceedings carried greater procedural
rights and substantive options than exclusion proceedings.127
IIRIRA replaced the statutory definition of “entry” with new lan-
guage defining “admission.”128 The purpose of the shift in focus from
entry to admission was to ensure that persons “who had entered with-
out inspection [would not have] greater procedural and substantive
rights . . . than those who had presented themselves for inspection at a
port of entry and had been placed in exclusion proceedings.”129 In the
years following the passage of IIRIRA, the significance of “admis-
sion” in the overall immigration scheme grew correspondingly. The
grounds of inadmissibility were substituted for the grounds of exclud-
ability.130 “Exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings were collapsed
into “removal” proceedings, in which noncitizens could be charged
under the grounds of inadmissibility or deportability.131
The Board grappled with the definition of “admission” long
before it gained its paramount position in immigration law. In the
landmark 1980 case Matter of Areguillin,132 the Board was tasked
with deciding whether a noncitizen had been “admitted” for purposes
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1958).
123. 14 I&N Dec. 467, 468 (BIA 1973) (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added).
125. Id. 
126. Id.; Elwin Griffith, Admission and Cancellation of Removal Under the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 979, 985 (2005).
127. See Mansoor v. Montgomery, 620 F. Supp. 708, 710–11 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012) defines “admission” as “the lawful entry of
the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer.”
129. Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285, 291 (BIA 2010) (citations omitted).
130. See BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 26–28. R
131. See id.
132. Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\17-1\NYL102.txt unknown Seq: 27 19-MAR-14 13:30
2014] “CONDITIONAL ADMISSION” AND OTHER MYSTERIES 63
of eligibility for adjustment of status.133 The noncitizen Respondent
had crossed the U.S.-Mexican border as a passenger, but an immigra-
tion officer questioned only the driver, who was a U.S. citizen, “then
permitted the car and its occupants to proceed into the United
States.”134 Although the Respondent was “inadmissible for lack of
documentation” at the time of her entry, the Board nonetheless found
that she had been “inspected and admitted” for purposes of adjustment
eligibility.135 Citing precedent dating back to 1941,136 the Board ob-
served that “an alien has not entered without inspection when he
presented himself for inspection and made no knowing false claim to
citizenship.”137 Although Areguillin was decided about a month after
the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, it affirmed and expounded
longstanding principles.138 The loose definition of admission in
Areguillin was reaffirmed in the 2010 case Matter of Quilantan.139
The two cases involved very similar facts, and Quilantan, like
Areguillin, limited its holding to the meaning of “admission” for pur-
poses of adjustment eligibility.140
By continuing to ascribe a meaning to “admission” specific to the
adjustment of status context, the Board effectively indicated that “ad-
mission” has no single meaning under the INA. Although this flies in
the face of the presumption of statutory consistency,141 it is not the
only instance where the Board has found it necessary to sidestep that
canon when sketching the contours of “admission.” While 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A) restricts the definition of “admission” to “the lawful
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and entry by
an immigration officer,” the Board has been forced to move outside
that definition in order to avoid absurd outcomes.
133. Then and now, adjustment of status generally requires that the noncitizen have
been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)
(2012).
134. Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. at 309.
135. Id. at 309–10.
136. Id. at 309.
137. Id. at 310 & n.4 (“‘Admission’ occurs when the inspecting officer communi-
cates to the applicant that he has determined that the applicant is not inadmissible . . . .
That communication has taken place when the inspector permits the applicant to pass
through the port of entry.”) (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 309 (collecting cases).
139. 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010).
140. Id. at 285–86. As in Areguillin, the Quilantan Respondent crossed the border in
a car driven by a U.S. citizen. The immigration inspector asked the driver if he was a
citizen, then “waved the car through the port of entry” without addressing the Respon-
dent. Id. at 286.
141. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION 271–74 (2d ed. 2006).
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One important example is the Board’s holding in Matter of Rosas
that a grant of adjustment of status amounts to an “admission.”142 In
Rosas, a 1999 case, a lawful permanent resident argued that because
she had entered the United States without inspection, she had never
been “admitted” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).143 Thus, the Respon-
dent’s argument went, because the grounds of deportability attach
only following an “admission,” her drug trafficking “aggravated fel-
ony” conviction could not form the basis for initiating removal pro-
ceedings.144 The Board rejected her argument in significant part
because it would produce procedural absurdities. As a lawful perma-
nent resident, the Respondent was not subject to the grounds of inad-
missibility,145 but under her reasoning the grounds of deportability did
not apply either. Ultimately, the Board concluded that the term “ad-
mission” is broader than the definitional language at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13), and includes adjustment of status to permanent
residency.146
B. Procedural Options: Inadmissibility Versus Deportability
Persons seeking admission to the United States are subject to the
grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C. § 1182.147 In order to obtain a
visa to enter the United States, or to adjust status once here, a nonci-
tizen must either show that no inadmissibility ground applies, or seek
a waiver of inadmissibility if available.148 Any person in the United
States who has not been admitted risks being charged as inadmissible
by DHS and placed in removal proceedings.
For persons present in the United States following admission,
however, the grounds of deportability at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 apply.149
Even if the status in which a noncitizen was initially admitted has
142. Rosas, 22 I&N Dec. 616, 619 (BIA 1999). There are two ways of gaining ad-
mission as a lawful permanent resident: “(1) inspection and authorization at the border
and (2) adjustment of status while in the United States.” Id.
143. Id. at 623.
144. See id. at 616–17, 623. A conviction for an “aggravated felony” is a de-
portability ground, but is not among the grounds of inadmissibility. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (including aggravated felonies among the deportability
grounds) with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (setting forth the grounds of inadmissibility).
For the definition of “aggravated felony,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012).
145. Lawful permanent residents are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility only if
they travel abroad and certain exceptions apply. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)
(2012).
146. Rosas, 22 I&N Dec. at 623.
147. See BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 26–30. R
148. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)–(i) (2012) (setting forth limited waivers of inad-
missibility for criminal conduct or misrepresentations).
149. BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 26–30. R
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expired, she remains subject to the grounds of deportability.150 Unless
and until a person naturalizes, she potentially could lose her immigra-
tion status and be deported.151
The procedural inequalities between “deportable” and “inadmis-
sible” noncitizens are manifold.
1. Burden of Proof and Evidentiary Thresholds
The burden of proof in removal proceedings depends on whether
the noncitizen is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility or de-
portability. For both groups, the government has the initial burden to
show “alienage”—i.e., that the respondent is not a U.S. citizen.152
Alienage is rarely disputed, however, as noncitizens typically admit
alienage when first encountering immigration authorities.153
Once alienage is established, the next issue is whether DHS has
properly initiated proceedings—i.e., whether the noncitizen is remov-
able as charged. If a person was previously admitted, the burden is on
DHS to show “by clear and convincing evidence” that the person is
“deportable.”154 If the noncitizen is deemed not admitted, however, all
burdens of proof rest on her. She must show either “that [she] is
clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted,” or that she is eligi-
ble for a waiver of inadmissibility or other defense to removal.155
Most grounds of deportability require DHS to meet a higher evi-
dentiary threshold than the grounds of inadmissibility. For example,
the majority of crime-related deportability grounds require a convic-
tion.156 The majority of crime-related inadmissibility grounds, on the
other hand, may be triggered not only by a conviction, but also by a
noncitizen’s admission to committing an offense, or even just to com-
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)–(D) (2012). One example is conditional permanent
resident status, whereby a noncitizen immigrates as a lawful permanent resident or
adjusts status based on marriage to a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident. If the
“conditions” are not removed following a statutory two-year test period—because, for
example, DHS believes the marriage was not bona fide—the noncitizen becomes de-
portable. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(b), 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) (2012); Stowers, 22 I&N Dec.
605, 605–06 (BIA 1999). Thus, although residency is lost, the admission remains.
151. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2)(B) (2012).
152. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2013) (requiring the government to establish alienage
upon initiating removal proceedings); see also Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238, 242 (BIA
1991) (noting that it is the government’s burden to prove alienage).
153. See, e.g., Gomez-Gomez, 23 I&N Dec. 522, 523 (BIA 2002) (describing nonci-
tizen’s admission of alienage to border patrol officer); Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I&N
Dec. 784, 784–85 (BIA 1999) (same); Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 609–10 (BIA
1988) (same).
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012).
155. See id. § 1229a(c)(2)(A).
156. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)–(B)(i), (a)(2)(C)–(E)(i), (a)(3)(B).
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mitting the “acts which constitute the essential elements” of a
crime.157 Moreover, some inadmissibility grounds are triggered by
mere evidence of prohibited conduct. For example, engaging in prosti-
tution is a bar to admission even without any showing that the conduct
met the elements of a particular criminal statute.158
Perhaps the lowest threshold is the “reason to believe” standard.
A noncitizen is inadmissible, for example, if an immigration officer
has a mere “reason to believe” that she has engaged in controlled sub-
stance trafficking.159 Courts have equated the “reason to believe” stan-
dard with “probable cause.”160 A police report, or an adjudication of
juvenile delinquency which, by definition, is not a crime,161 may be
sufficient to meet the standard. Thus, any documents or testimony
suggesting that a noncitizen has engaged in conduct relating to an in-
admissibility ground may put her in the position of attempting to
prove a negative.162
2. Mandatory Detention During Removal Proceedings
In 1996, Congress introduced mandatory detention for broad cat-
egories of noncitizens with even minor criminal offenses throughout
removal proceedings.163 One of the most serious consequences of the
1996 provisions is that mandatory detention attaches not only during
proceedings in Immigration Court, but also while an appeal is pending
157. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).
158. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(D).
159. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(C); see also id. § 1182(a)(2)(H)–(I) (inadmissibility for reason
to believe that a noncitizen has been involved in human trafficking or  money
laundering).
160. See U-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 355, 356 (BIA 2002); see also Westover v. Reno, 202
F.3d 475, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 2000) (suggesting that the “reason to believe” standard is
akin to the “probable cause” standard).
161. See Devison, 22 I&N Dec. 1362, 1377 (BIA 2000); M-U-, 2 I&N Dec. 92, 93
(BIA 1944).
162. In general, it is far easier for the government to charge a person with inadmissi-
bility than deportability, but there are exceptions. For example, a conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) with a maximum possible sentence of one
year, and for which the actual term of incarceration imposed was six months or less, is
a “petty offense” that does not render a noncitizen inadmissible for a CIMT. See
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). Such a conviction, however, could render an admitted nonci-
tizen deportable if committed within five years after admission. Id. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
163. See Martin, Constitutional Protections, supra note 7, at 61–63 (discussing the R
passage and repeal of mandatory detention provisions prior to the 1996 enactment of
IIRIRA and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214).
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before the Board–even if the noncitizen won her case at trial.164 Thus,
mandatory detention threatens noncitizens with confinement for many
months or years.165
If a noncitizen is subject to mandatory detention, the Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) has no jurisdiction to redetermine custody.166 In other
words, once DHS arrests and detains a noncitizen, she has no recourse
to the immigration court.167 In general, inadmissible noncitizens are
more likely to be detained for very minor offenses than deportable
noncitizens.168 For example, a single offense for simple possession of
marijuana automatically triggers mandatory detention for inadmissible
noncitizens,169 but not deportable ones.170 A single, minor offense in-
volving “moral turpitude,” such as larceny, may also trigger
mandatory confinement for inadmissible noncitizens.171 Therefore,
whether a noncitizen is subject to inadmissibility or deportability
could determine whether he spends months or even years in immigra-
tion custody, or is able to return home to his family.
Additionally, DHS has the authority to hold “arriving aliens” in
custody throughout removal proceedings, without any possibility of
review by an IJ.172 Many asylum-seekers come to the United States as
164. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012); cf. Galvez v. Lewis, 56 F. Supp. 2d 637, 647
(E.D. Va. 1999) (“Petitioner may be released simply by withdrawing his appeal of the
deportation proceeding and returning voluntarily to his native land of El Salvador,
thus ending his detention immediately.”).
165. The numerous long-term detention cases litigated recently in the federal courts
illustrate how lengthy the period of mandatory detention can be. See, e.g., Diop v.
ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 223 (3d Cir. 2011) (1,072 days of detention);
Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F. Supp. 2d 455, 462 (D. Mass. 2010) (22 months
of detention); Sengkeo v. Horgan, 670 F. Supp. 2d 116, 118 (D. Mass. 2009) (almost
20 months of detention).
166. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(D) (2013).
167. The limited exception is that the IJ may hold a hearing to determine whether the
noncitizen has been correctly labeled a “mandatory” detainee. See Joseph, 22 I&N
Dec. 799, 800 (BIA 1999).
168. One notable exception is that a firearms offense is a ground of mandatory de-
tention for deportable noncitizens but not inadmissible noncitizens. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1)(A) (2012) with §  1226(c)(1)(B).
169. See id. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 1226(c)(1)(A).
170. A conviction for simple marijuana possession does not even render a noncitizen
deportable, unless the amount was greater than thirty grams. See id. §§ 1226(c)(1)(B),
1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
171. Compare § 1226(c)(1)(A) (mandating detention for inadmissible persons with
single CIMTs) with § 1226(c)(1)(C) (triggering mandatory detention for a single
CIMT only if a one-year sentence was imposed).
172. See X-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 731, 732, 735 (BIA 2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q) (2013)
(defining “arriving alien” as “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to
come into the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the
United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United
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arriving aliens, requesting protection from persecution at a port of en-
try. If asylum was granted but later terminated, the former asylee’s
entitlement to request bond from an IJ would hinge entirely on
whether the asylum grant amounted to an admission, and whether the
termination stripped away not only asylum status, but also any admis-
sion that came with it.173 If the former asylee was deemed not admit-
ted, she would revert to arriving alien status, with all the
accompanying legal impediments.174 This could occur even following
an asylee’s adjustment to permanent residency. Asylum (and perma-
nent residency deriving from it) may be lost for a host of reasons,
including changed circumstances in the country of origin, the asylee’s
obtaining a passport from her country of origin, her travelling back to
the homeland for any reason, or the commission of certain crimes.175
3. Eligibility for Relief from Removal
A noncitizen’s eligibility for a defense to removal may hinge on
whether she was admitted, and if so, her date of admission. This issue
commonly arises when a lawful permanent resident’s eligibility for
cancellation of removal is at stake. The statute requires an applicant to
have accrued seven years of residence after being “admitted in any
status” to qualify for cancellation of removal.176 Thus, for example, a
person paroled in 2003, and who adjusted status in 2007, would not be
eligible for cancellation of removal if placed in proceedings in 2013.
This is because only six years have passed since her admission as a
lawful permanent resident and parole is not deemed an
“admission.”177
For refugees, this issue is of relatively little importance, because
a refugee’s adjustment of status is backdated to the date of resettle-
States waters and brought into the United States by any means, whether or not to a
designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of transport”).
173. See X-K-, 23 I&N Dec. at 732.
174. In extreme cases of very long custody, the federal courts have granted petitions
for a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.
2006).
175. See § 1158(c)(2); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FACT SHEET:
TRAVELING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AS AN ASYLUM APPLICANT, AN ASYLEE, OR
A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT WHO OBTAINED SUCH STATUS BASED ON ASYLUM
STATUS (2007) [hereinafter USCIS, TRAVEL FACT SHEET]. S. 744, 113th Cong.
§ 3411 (2013), part of an immigration reform bill passed by the Senate on June 27,
2013, establishes a presumption that asylum status should be terminated if an asylee
travels back to her country of origin—even years after the grant, when return to the
homeland no longer would suggest fraud in the application.
176. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2012).
177. Id. § 1101(a)(13)(B).
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ment.178 For asylees, on the other hand, it can be immensely impor-
tant. Asylees’ adjustment of status is backdated only one year, so
whether the initial grant of asylum amounts to an admission can de-
cide eligibility.179
Another obstacle to relief is that persons who entered without
inspection are generally ineligible to adjust status.180 Many asylum-
seekers flee persecution and enter the United States without being in-
spected.181 If such an asylee’s status were terminated, she would be
eligible to apply for lawful permanent residency only if the initial asy-
lum grant amounted to an “admission” that survived termination.
C. Constitutional Rights and Indefinite Detention
The question whether a person has been admitted takes on signif-
icant constitutional dimensions in cases involving prolonged, some-
times indefinite, detention. Three Supreme Court cases have explored
the constitutionality of indefinite detention most prominently: Shaugh-
nessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,182 Zadvydas v. Davis,183 and
Clark v. Martinez.184 Mezei, which held that indefinite detention was
constitutional for noncitizens who never effected an “entry,” was de-
cided well before IIRIRA, while Zadvydas and Martinez came well
after.
Curiously, the Supreme Court did not address in the latter two
cases whether the post-IIRIRA shift in focus from “entry” to “admis-
sion” for purposes of immigration procedure moved the line in the
sand for constitutional analyses. Perhaps the Court assumed it, or per-
haps the Justices believed that the issue was not relevant to either mat-
ter.185 In any event, the Court sidestepped a constitutional analysis by
178. Id. § 1159(a)(2).
179. See id. § 1159(b). For an in-depth discussion and analysis of the relevance of
the date of admission to eligibility for relief from removal, see Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec.
397 (BIA 2011).
180. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
181. See, e.g., R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (BIA 2001) (asylum seeker who entered with-
out inspection); Villalta, 20 I&N Dec. 142 (BIA 1990) (same).
182. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
183. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
184. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
185. In fact, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas incorrectly inserted the term “entry”
rather than “admission” into a quotation from the post-1996 statute:
An alien ordered removed [1] who is inadmissible . . . [2] [or] removable
[as a result of violations of status requirements or entry conditions, viola-
tions of criminal law, or reasons of security or foreign policy] or [3] who
has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the commu-
nity or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained
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interpreting a statute post-dating Mezei to prohibit the indefinite de-
tention of noncitizens, whether admitted or not.
Numerous members of Congress have attempted to legislate both
opinions away, including during the current round of debates over
comprehensive immigration reform. Such amendments would force
the Supreme Court to reexamine Mezei’s constitutional holding. The
proposals illustrate the continued vulnerability of noncitizens who
have not been admitted to the loss of constitutional protections.
1. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei
In Mezei, the Supreme Court drew a sharp constitutional line be-
tween persons who had “entered” the United States and those who had
not. The respondent, Ignatz Mezei, lived in the United States as a law-
ful permanent resident from 1923 to 1948, traveled to Hungary for
nineteen months, and then sought to re-enter the United States in
1950.186 On Mezei’s return, the Attorney General ordered him perma-
nently excluded from the United States based on unspecified security
risks.187 However, neither Hungary nor any other country was willing
to accept him for deportation.188 After more than a year’s confinement
on Ellis Island, Mezei petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.189
The Court rebuffed Mezei’s bid for release, and in doing so ar-
ticulated the inferior constitutional protections afforded noncitizens
who have not yet “entered” the United States. As the Court famously
wrote, “aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,
may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional stan-
dards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”190 However,
“an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing:
Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”191 Although Mezei had
been allowed to land on Ellis Island for inspection, legally he was
beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain]
terms of supervision . . . .
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V)).
186. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208, 213.
187. Id. at 208.
188. Id. at 208–09.
189. See id. at 209.
190. Id. at 212.
191. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a critique of
Mezei and its predecessor, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950), see David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Commu-
nity: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165 (1982-1983).
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“stopped at the border.”192 Accordingly, the Court found, his contin-
ued exclusion—and indefinite confinement—did not “deprive[ ] him
of any . . . constitutional right.”193
2. Zadvydas v. Davis and Clark v. Martinez
Zadvydas came before the Court almost fifty years after Mezei,
by which time IIRIRA had shifted the focal point of immigration pro-
cedure from “entry” to “admission.” It involved two lawful permanent
residents, Kestutis Zadvydas and Kim Ho Ma, who were ordered re-
moved for criminal convictions, but whom no country agreed to repa-
triate.194 Their consolidated cases presented the question whether
noncitizens who were “admitted” but subsequently ordered removed
were in the same constitutional position as the Mezei detainee, and
thus subject to indefinite detention. The Court skirted the issue, how-
ever, by invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance.195
Zadvydas involved the “post-removal statute,” which undergirds
the detention regime for persons with final administrative orders of
removal.196 Under the statute, DHS “may” continue to incarcerate
noncitizens with final orders when deportation proves difficult.197 The
government contended that the post-removal statute authorizes indefi-
nite detention for all noncitizens with final orders.198 Indeed, because
the statute identifies no terminating event, DHS detained numerous
persons under this provision for years.199
The Court distinguished the two noncitizens’ circumstances from
Mezei’s, observing that Mezei was arrested prior to “entering” the
United States, whereas Zadvydas and Ma had both been “admitted” as
lawful permanent residents.200 According to the Court, “[a] statute
permitting indefinite detention of [admitted noncitizens] would raise a
192. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215.
193. Id.
194. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684–86 (2001).
195. Id. at 689–90.
196. A final administrative order is an IJ order that was not appealed, or a Board
order following an appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (2013).
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2012). There are myriad reasons why it is sometimes
difficult for the government to effect removal. For example, the United States may
have no repatriation treaty with the homeland; the country of origin might refuse to
issue a travel document due to a noncitizen’s health conditions; or the purported
homeland may not recognize the person as its citizen. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
684, 686  (indicating that neither Germany nor Lithuania agreed to issue travel docu-
ments to Zadvydas, and that the United States had no repatriation treaty with
Cambodia).
198. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
199. Zadvydas himself was detained from at least 1994 to 1997. See id. at 684–85.
200. See Zadvydas,  533 U.S. at 682, 693–94.
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serious constitutional problem,” implicating the liberty interest pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment.201 To avoid the constitutional ques-
tion, the Court “read an implicit [time] limitation into the statute.”202
The Court held that noncitizens should be released after six months’
confinement if “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.”203
Following the Zadvydas decision, previously admitted nonci-
tizens were released from detention facilities across the country, but
noncitizens deemed never admitted remained incarcerated.204 At that
time in immigration law history, whether a noncitizen was charged as
inadmissible or deportable in removal proceedings was critical to her
long-term custody status. That distinction was erased (but not irrevo-
cably) when Martinez was decided in 2005.
Martinez involved two Cubans, Sergio Suarez Martinez and
Daniel Benitez, who had been paroled into the United States during
the 1980 Mariel boatlift.205 It was undisputed that the two men had
never been “admitted” to the United States.206 Years later, both men
applied for adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act, a
statute that permitted paroled Cubans to obtain green cards after one
year’s physical presence in the United States.207 Both men were inad-
missible, however, because of criminal convictions occurring subse-
quent to their parole.208 The former INS therefore revoked parole and
denied adjustment of status.209 The men were ordered removed and
held in detention for years.210 Removal was not possible because Cuba
generally refuses to accept deportation from the United States.211
Justice Scalia authored the concise opinion. Because the post-re-
moval statute applies equally to inadmissible and deportable nonci-
tizens, and the Zadvydas court read a reasonableness limitation into
the provision, the Court held that the limitation applied to all nonci-
201. Id. at 690.
202. Id. at 689.
203. Id. at 701.
204. The Zadvydas decision affected an estimated 3,000 immigration detainees. See
Supreme Court Finds Presumptive Six-Month Limit to Post-Removal-Period Deten-
tion, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1125, 1126 (2001).
205. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 374 (2005).
206. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 374–75.
207. Id. at 374.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 374–75.
210. Id. at 375–76.
211. See id. at 386. This excepts the classified list of a limited number of Mariel
Cubans whom Cuba accepts for deportation. See Alfonso Chardy, Reagan-Era Accord
Allows for Deportations of Some Mariel Refugees, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 26, 2010, at
1A.
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tizens.212 In other words, Zadvydas was a statutory decision, not a
constitutional one, and a statute may be read only one way.213 At the
same time, Scalia noted, Congress retained the option of amending the
statute to establish that noncitizens could be detained indefinitely.214
3. Continued Vulnerability
As the foregoing shows, noncitizens deemed not admitted are in
an inferior legal position to those deemed admitted. They are at
greater risk of the deprivation of liberty, and have lesser procedural
and due process rights. The loss of liberty, and the reduction of proce-
dural options, may occur not only through the administrative and judi-
cial processes but also through the legislative process.
As Scalia observed in Martinez, members of Congress are able to
amend the post-removal statute to authorize indefinite detention ex-
plicitly, because both Zadvydas and Martinez are statute-based deci-
sions. Indeed, since Martinez legislation has repeatedly been proposed
that would supersede Martinez and even Zadvydas. Such legislation
could have consequences for both refugees and asylees, but the pros-
pects for a successful constitutional challenge would be greater if both
categories were deemed (unconditionally) admitted. Innumerable
asylees initially come to the United States either without inspection or
as arriving aliens. If such asylees were to lose status, and the termina-
tion of asylum status also terminated any admission that came with it,
those noncitizens could be subject to indefinite detention under
Mezei’s reasoning. Under the Board’s reasoning in the 2012 case Mat-
ter of D-K-, refugees were expressly deemed “admitted” only for
charging purposes.215 Until the Board or a higher court recognizes that
refugee admission carries the same rights as other noncitizen “admis-
sions,” one cannot predict how their admission status would be cate-
gorized for purposes of analyzing the constitutionality of indefinite
detention. As surprising as it sounds, DHS for years alleged in re-
moval proceedings that refugees were “arriving aliens” effectively
212. See Martinez, 543 U.S. at 377–78. As a result of the Martinez decision, several
hundred Mariel Cubans were ordered released from immigration detention. See Mem-
orandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S. Citizenship & Im-
migration Servs., Implementation of Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005), at 1
(Mar. 7, 2005).
213. See Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378.
214. See id. at 386. Scalia even offered an example of congressional legislation su-
perseding Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 386 n.8 (observing that a statute en-
acted after the Court’s decision in Zadvydas expressly authorized continued detention
of any alien for a period of six months beyond the removal period under certain
circumstances).
215. 25 I&N Dec. 761 (BIA 2012).
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“stopped at the border”;216 or that they were present in the United
States without valid visas or travel documents; or even that they ini-
tially “entered without inspection.”217 It remains to be seen what posi-
tion the government would take in any challenge to indefinite
detention.
Several bills introduced after Zadvydas and Martinez illustrate
the risk. For example, Texas Congressman Lamar Smith took up
Scalia’s suggestion from Martinez in his proposed Keep Our Commu-
nities Safe Act of 2011.218 Smith’s bill would have authorized the in-
definite detention of all noncitizens for any of a laundry list of
reasons, including the judicial grant of a stay of removal during a fed-
eral court appeal, failure to cooperate in the removal process, or a
prior conviction for an “aggravated felony.”219 Smith’s bill, if passed,
would have forced the very issue the Supreme Court avoided in
Zadvydas: whether a statute explicitly authorizing indefinite detention
is constitutional as applied to previously admitted noncitizens.220
Iowa’s Senator Chuck Grassley proposed a similar measure in the
Senate Judiciary Committee for inclusion in S. 744, the Senate bill
that passed on June 27, 2013 as part of current efforts at comprehen-
sive immigration reform.221 Fortunately, Grassley’s amendment was
voted down, but it did have other supporters.
As I indicated in the Introduction, the Comprehensive Reform
Act of 2006, which passed in the Senate but failed in the House, in-
cluded provisions increasing the government’s authority to hold
noncitizens for indefinite periods, in particular noncitizens who never
effected an “entry” (i.e., arriving aliens).222 In other words, had the
bill passed in the House, it would have superseded Martinez, com-
mencing a new era of litigation over indefinite detention.
216. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (defining “arriving alien”). R
217. See infra note 264 and accompanying text. R
218. See H.R. 1932, 112th Cong. (2011).
219. See id. § 2(a). Of course “aggravated felonies” need be neither “aggravated”
nor “felonies.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining the term “aggravated fel-
ony”). The classic example of a minor crime that is classified as an aggravated felony
is a shoplifting conviction carrying a sentence of one year or more, whether suspended
or imposed. See id. § 1101(a)(43)(G), (48)(B).
220. The Zadvydas majority justified its invocation of the constitutional avoidance
doctrine in part through its finding that no clear congressional statement authorized
indefinite detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).
221. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. (as passed by the Senate, June 27, 2013).
222. See Comprehensive Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 202 (as
passed by the Senate, May 25, 2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\17-1\NYL102.txt unknown Seq: 39 19-MAR-14 13:30
2014] “CONDITIONAL ADMISSION” AND OTHER MYSTERIES 75
Noncitizens are also vulnerable to legislation expanding deten-
tion during proceedings, prior to any entry of a removal order. Smith’s
proposed bill illustrates the general perception that persons deemed
never admitted should receive less process. For example, Smith pro-
poses stripping IJs of jurisdiction over bond determinations for all
inadmissible noncitizens, regardless of their criminal history or per-
sonal situation.223 Because of the lower constitutional standing of per-
sons deemed not admitted, it is easier to defend such a bill against
legal challenges.
In short, immigration procedure and constitutional doctrine gen-
erally afford inferior process to noncitizens deemed not “admitted.”
III.
“ADMISSION” AND THE LONG-TERM DISPLACED
Having explored the genesis of the relevant statutes and the sig-
nificance of “admission” in the immigration system, I now explain
why refugees and asylees should be deemed unconditionally admitted
upon obtaining those statuses. The Refugee Act always has referred
throughout to refugees’ “admission,” without appending the term
“conditional” as a modifier. The first implementing regulations, how-
ever, which were codified in 1981, subjected refugees denied adjust-
ment of status to “exclusion proceedings.”224 Because only
noncitizens who had not been admitted could be placed in exclusion
proceedings, the regulations muddied the waters and lent support to
the Board’s earliest case law conclusions that refugee “admission”
was somehow less than a true “admission.” Those regulations have
long been repealed, however, and the statute and regulations now
point inexorably to the conclusion that refugee “admission” affords
the same panoply of rights as the “admission” of other categories of
noncitizens. As such, the Board’s 2012 decision in Matter of D-K-,
which held that refugees are “admitted” for charging purposes, but
characterized refugee admission status as “conditional,” “imperma-
nent,” and “subject to contingencies,” got it only half right.225
The correct outcome for asylees is more challenging to discern.
The statute is ambiguous, and the earliest regulations made clear that
asylum was not an admission. Today’s regulations, however, follow-
ing subsequent codifications and recodifications, characterize asylum
as an “admission.” Not only are Immigration Judges and the Board
223. See H.R. 1932, § 2(b)(6).
224. 46 Fed. Reg. 45,116, 45,119 (Sept. 10, 1981) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(1)
(1982)).
225. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
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bound by agency regulations, but agency guidance also treats asylum
as an admission.226 The only federal court that has directly confronted
the question found that asylum was an “entry,” and apparently
squeezed a concession out of appellate counsel that asylum is also an
“admission.” Indeed, the Board of Immigration Appeals in several
precedential decisions, including one of the best known immigration
law cases, Matter of Kasinga, ordered noncitizens “admitted as . . .
asylee[s]” in granting their claims. For this reason, the 2013 case Mat-
ter of V-X-, which found that asylum is not an admission, came as a
large surprise to the immigration community—and its superficial rea-
soning is insufficient to overcome all the above-mentioned interpre-
tive touchstones.
I also address the important corollary question whether the termi-
nation of asylum status strips away any admission that came with it.
As detailed below, treating the admission as surviving termination is
harmonious with the greater body of immigration law, as that is how
other terminable statuses are dealt with under the INA.
Recall that in order to gain either refugee status under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157 or asylee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, a noncitizen must show
that she meets the definition of “refugee” at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Because of the overlapping terminology, I have referred to “resettled
refugees” when addressing § 1157 refugees and to “asylees” when ad-
dressing § 1158 refugees. The primary distinction between the two
groups is how they obtain status in the United States. Resettled refu-
gees were interviewed abroad and, once found to qualify, were offered
a resettlement slot by the United States.227 Asylees applied for status
when they were already here, either affirmatively to DHS, or, if in
removal proceedings, defensively before an IJ.228
A. Resettled Refugees
In this section, I analyze the case law, statutory amendments, and
regulatory developments relating to resettled refugees since passage of
the Refugee Act in 1980. The authority points inexorably to the con-
clusion that refugees are “admitted,” and that their admission is no
more tenuous than other modes of “admission” that have not been the
226. Such nonlegislative rules do not carry the force of law. See Kevin M. Stack,
Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 357 n.4 (2012) (citations omitted).
However, their language parallels the wording in regulations produced after notice
and comment, and could be persuasive.
227. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PRO-
CESS AND POLICY 797–98 (7th ed. 2012).
228. See id. at 798, 815–16.
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subject of such controversy. The Board case Matter of D-K-229 took a
big step in the right direction by finding that refugees are “admitted”
for charging purposes—but stopped there. Whether, and to what ex-
tent, the ruling has exposed refugees to adverse legal outcomes will be
revealed through future legislation, developments in detention policy,
and litigation. Immigration scholars and litigators should deploy Mat-
ter of D-K- to move the law to where it should be—i.e., towards rec-
ognizing that the old cases characterizing refugee admission as
“conditional” are no longer relevant.
1. The Root of the Problem? Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray and
Subsequent Precedent
For decades, the character of refugees’ “admission” status was
controlled by the 1986 Board case Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray.230
The Garcia Respondent was a Cuban refugee resettled in June 1980
under the newly minted Refugee Act.231 Following a 1981 conviction
for burglary of a vehicle, the former INS purported to revoke his pa-
role and initiated exclusion proceedings.232 The IJ terminated proceed-
ings, finding that the Respondent had not been “paroled” under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), but rather “admitted as a refugee under” the new
Act.233 Therefore, the IJ found, the Respondent was not an “applicant
for admission,” and could not be placed in exclusion proceedings.234
The Board agreed with the IJ that the Respondent had not been
“paroled,” but rejected the IJ’s finding that he was not an “applicant
for admission.” Rather, the Board stated, the Refugee Act “provided
for conditional admission of all refugees entering the United
States.”235 The Board continued:
We note that in providing that all refugees entering the United
States be admitted conditionally, Congress specifically rejected the
provisions in the Senate’s version of the Refugee Act which would
have admitted refugees entering the United States as lawful perma-
nent residents.236
229. 25 I&N Dec. 761, 769 (BIA 2012).
230. 19 I&N Dec. 407 (BIA 1986).
231. See id. at 407.
232. Id. at 407–08.
233. Id. at 408.
234. Id.
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. Id. (emphases added) (citing S. REP. NO. 256, at 4, 7–10 (1979), and H. R. REP.
NO. 781, at 19, 21 (1979)).
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In making this statement, the Board cited to the legislative his-
tory237—as it had to, because the Act did not “provide” that refugees
would be admitted “conditionally.” Moreover, there are infinite vari-
eties of “admission” that do not amount to permanent residency, so
Congress’ rejection of the Senate version of the Act did not mean that
“refugee status” was not an “admission.”
The Board affirmed the IJ’s termination of proceedings, but on
different grounds.238 According to the Board, refugees are entitled to
an adjudication of their eligibility for permanent residency prior to any
initiation of proceedings, and no such adjudication had occurred.239
But here is the rub: the Act’s implementing regulations stated that any
refugee denied adjustment of status “may renew the request for admis-
sion . . . as an immigrant in exclusion proceedings.”240 The Board was
(and still is) required to follow executive branch regulations.241 Thus,
the Board had to shoehorn its interpretation of refugee “admission”
into the implementing regulations, and it did so by finding that the
Refugee Act made admission “conditional.”242
The next published Board case involving refugee admissions,
Matter of H-N-,243 was decided thirteen years later. In this 1999 case,
the Board did not explore the subtleties of refugee “admission,” as the
Respondent evidently did not dispute the former INS’ charge that she
was “inadmissible” for a robbery conviction.244 Rather, the issue
before the Board was whether IJs have jurisdiction to adjudicate waiv-
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 408–10.
240. Id. at 410 (emphasis added) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(1) (1986)).
241. See Ponce de Leon, 21 I&N Dec. 154, 158 (BIA 1996) (“The Board is bound to
uphold agency regulations.”); Board of Immigration Appeals, Procedural Reforms to
Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,884 (Aug. 26, 2002).
242. Curiously, the regulations in force at the time Garcia was decided referred
throughout to refugee “admission” without appending the term “conditional.” 46 Fed.
Reg. 45,116 passim (Sept. 10, 1981). The only exception was at 8 C.F.R. § 207.4,
which indicated that an approved application for refugee status “authorize[d] the dis-
trict director of the port of entry in the United States to admit the applicant condition-
ally as a refugee upon arrival at the port.” Id. at 45,119 (emphasis added). However,
because the regulations also created procedures for terminating refugee status if the
noncitizen did not meet the definition of refugee when admitted, the potentiality of
termination could be interpreted as creating the conditionality to which § 207.4 re-
ferred. The regulations also indicated that resettled refugees have effected an “en-
try”—whereas under then-governing law noncitizens who had “entered” could not be
placed in exclusion proceedings. Id. at 45,119 (“Every alien . . . paroled into the
United States as a refugee . . . shall be considered as having entered the United
States . . . .”). The regulations were thus internally inconsistent.
243. 22 I&N Dec. 1039 (BIA 1999).
244. See id. at 1039–40.
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ers of inadmissibility in refugee adjustment cases.245 Such waivers are
available under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) to refugees and asylees only.
The Board held en banc that IJs do have authority to adjudicate
§ 1159(c) waivers, and mentioned only in passing that the INS had
charged the Respondent under the grounds of inadmissibility.246 This
is not terribly surprising, because the parties had not raised the issue of
whether the Respondent had been admitted. On the other hand, the
Board’s discussion of the procedural history reveals a striking over-
sight. At the opening of its opinion, the Board observed that the Re-
spondent had “arrived” in the United States as a “refugee,” and that
the INS later revoked her “parole.”247 These statements are incompati-
ble, because refugees resettled under 8 U.S.C. § 1157—as the Board
indicated that the Respondent was—are not “paroled” into the United
States.248 Moreover, had “parole” been the Respondent’s manner of
crossing the border, she could not have adjusted status under § 1159,
or applied for a § 1159(c) waiver.249
If any procedural wrinkle existed that was capable of morphing
the Respondent’s “refugee” status into “parole,” while keeping availa-
ble a § 1159(c) waiver, the en banc Board should have explained it. If
there was no such procedural wrinkle, the Board should have noted
the INS’ mistake. In other words, both the Board and the INS evinced
insufficient understanding of the basics of refugee procedure. It ap-
pears that, as of 1999, both the Board and the INS remained intellectu-
ally tethered to the Fair Share Act of 1960—the last major piece of
legislation providing for the “parole” of “refugees.”250 Either that, or
the Board and the INS were conflating refugee resettlement under 8
U.S.C. § 1157 and the executive’s frequent invocation of the parole
power at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) to resettle de facto refugees.251 Cer-
tainly, the Board’s decision reveals a lack of insight into the nuances
of the Refugee Act of 1980.
The Attorney General’s 2002 decision in Matter of Jean252 also
reveals procedural oversights. Unlike the Board, however, the Attor-
245. Id. at 1040.
246. See id. at 1044.
247. Id. at 1039–40.
248. There is a narrow exception for persons “paroled into the United States as a
refugee after April 1, 1980 and before May 18, 1980.” 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(2) (2013).
249. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2012) (controlling the adjustment of status of refugees
and asylees only).
250. See supra Part I.D.
251. See supra Part I.B.
252. 23 I&N Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002). The Attorney General has the authority to re-
view decisions of the Board pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(1)(i) (2013).
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ney General deliberately highlighted others’ errors. In a footnote, the
Attorney General chastised the IJ and the Board for (in his view) in-
correctly characterizing the arrival status of resettled refugees:
The opinions of both the immigration judge and the BIA inaccu-
rately characterize the nature of the respondent’s entry into the
United States. She was neither paroled nor permanently admitted
into the country. Rather she was conditionally admitted as a refu-
gee under [8 U.S.C. § 1157].253
Even so, the Attorney General himself danced around the issue of
refugee “admission,” twice referring to “[a]liens . . . who have been
admitted (or conditionally admitted) as refugees.”254 In observing that
a refugee denied adjustment of status is subject to removal proceed-
ings, the Attorney General commented that the “INS is free to charge
[the refugee] . . . with any applicable ground of inadmissibility or
deportability.”255
Notwithstanding these discussions of refugee “admission,” the
Respondent’s admission status was not squarely before the Attorney
General. As in H-N-, the Jean Respondent did not attempt to rebut the
government’s charge that she was inadmissible for a crime involving
moral turpitude.256 Thus, it appears that the Attorney General was at-
tempting through dicta to rectify recurring legal errors relating to refu-
gees—not to respond to issues raised in the case.257
Another critique by the Attorney General is tangential to the “ad-
mission” question, but nonetheless illuminating. In a footnote, the At-
torney General made the following observation:
Although the IJ’s reasoning is not entirely clear from his brief oral
decision, he appears to have improperly analyzed the respondent’s
adjustment of status application under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1255 . . .
which bars relief to aliens convicted of crimes involving moral tur-
pitude . . . rather than [8 U.S.C. § 1159], which contains no such
express proscription.258
Recall that the Respondent was in proceedings in the first place
because she had been charged with inadmissibility for a crime involv-
253. Id. at 374 n.4 (emphases in original) (citing Garcia, 19 I&N Dec. 407, 408–10
(BIA 1986)). Ironically, the Attorney General chose to use the word “entry,” another
distinct term of art, in the above quote.
254. Id. at 376 n.7, 381.
255. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
256. Id.
257. In another example, the Attorney General criticized the INS for failing to follow
Garcia’s procedures, observing that “the INS had prematurely initiated removal pro-
ceedings against the respondent without affording her an opportunity to seek adjust-
ment of status under [8 U.S.C. § 1159].” Id. at 375 n.6.
258. Id. at 376 n.7 (emphasis added).
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ing moral turpitude. The bulk of the Attorney General’s opinion was
devoted to the question of whether she should be granted a § 1159(c)
waiver, forgiving the crime and allowing her to adjust status. As the
case makes abundantly clear, a crime involving moral turpitude is just
as much a bar in the refugee adjustment context as it is in a typical
family- or employment-based adjustment application.259 Thus, despite
bemoaning the errors of the INS, the Board, and the IJ, the Attorney
General also misread the statute.
The collective missteps illuminated in these opinions can only be
viewed as a disturbing indication that insufficient attention was de-
voted to understanding the legal framework governing resettled refu-
gees, twenty-two years after passage of the Refugee Act.
2. The Turning Point That Did Not Turn: IIRIRA
Because the issue of refugee admission status was not squarely
presented in H-N- or Jean, neither the Board nor the Attorney General
was forced to confront a significant intervening event: the passage of
IIRIRA. As discussed previously, IIRIRA introduced a statutory defi-
nition of “admission” in 1996: “The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’
mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration of-
ficer.”260 This language is in the opening, definitional section of the
INA. It defines “admission” for the entire statute.
The codification of this language, plus the complete absence of
the term “conditional” from the Refugee Act, should have immedi-
ately clarified refugees’ admission status under the classic canons of
statutory construction. 8 U.S.C. § 1157 employs the terms “admitted,”
“admission,” or “admit(s)” at least thirty-six times. Similarly, the refu-
gee adjustment of status provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1159 consistently re-
fers to refugees’ “admission.” As the Supreme Court teaches, “[w]e
should, of course, read the two sections [of a statute] as consistent
rather than conflicting.”261 Moreover, “[w]here, as here, Congress de-
259. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2012), which sets forth the grounds of inadmissibility
that do or do not apply to refugees. The bar for crimes involving moral turpitude
indisputably applies to refugees and asylees. The difference is the statutory authority
for requesting a waiver: refugees and asylees request forgiveness under § 1159(c),
while most other applicants seek waivers pursuant to § 1182(h). Compare § 1159(c)
with § 1182(h).
260. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012).
261. Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 316 U.S. 107, 112 (1942). Of course, the
presumption inherent in the consistent meaning doctrine may be rebutted where it
undermines the overarching statutory framework. See Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit &
Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198, 200–02, 206 (1949). After thoroughly researching the
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fines what a particular term ‘means,’ that definition controls to the
exclusion of any meaning that is not explicitly stated in the defini-
tion.”262 Finally, Congress is presumed to have been aware of the re-
peated employment of the term “admission” in §§ 1157 and 1159
when enacting IIRIRA.263 Congress had the opportunity to distinguish
refugee “admission” from the definition at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) had
it wished to. Thus, IIRIRA should have eliminated any doubt upon
passage: Refugees are “admitted” when they pass through a port of
entry upon resettlement in the United States.
The conflict between a plain reading of the statute and adminis-
trative precedent wrought havoc in the immigration courts, and led to
wildly unpredictable DHS charging practices.264 For a new generation
of immigration attorneys, it quite logically appeared that there was a
single definition of “admission,” and that the definition applied to ref-
ugees. But immigration adjudicators and DHS did not always see it
that way, as evidenced by the following language in a 2010 DHS
memorandum:
The [Detention and Removal] Field Office, in the exercise of dis-
cretion, may make a determination to issue [a Notice to Appear] to
any unadjusted refugee for whom it believes there is prima facie
evidence of inadmissibility under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)] or de-
portability under [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)], regardless of whether the
individual’s refugee status has been terminated and even if USCIS
has not yet considered the refugee’s adjustment application. Al-
though DHS is working to achieve clarity in the law, some immi-
gration courts have taken varied positions on whether someone
initially admitted as a refugee under [8 U.S.C. § 1157] is most ap-
issue, however, I have not identified an argument by a scholar, a litigator or an adjudi-
cator that reading the term “conditional” into the statute is more harmonious with the
overarching framework than adhering to the definition of admission at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A).
262. United States v. Roberson, 459 F.3d 39, 53 (1st Cir. 2006).
263. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 227
(2007).
264. In the years leading up to the Chaparro memorandum, infra note 265, DHS R
charged resettled refugees inconsistently as, for example: (1) inadmissible for having
entered without inspection; (2) inadmissible “arriving aliens”; (3) inadmissible for
failure to possess a valid visa or other travel document; or even (4) inadmissible for
criminal convictions following “admission” as a refugee. See, e.g., Lee v. Kane, No.
CV 09-1643-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 3378502, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 20, 2009) (indicat-
ing that an IJ sustained DHS’ allegation that a refugee was an “arriving alien”); Dong
v. Holder, No. CV-09-1594-PHX-JWS (LOA), 2011 WL 1119543, at *1 (D. Ariz.
Feb. 7, 2011) (showing that DHS charged a refugee inadmissible for failure to possess
a valid visa or other travel document). Notices to Appear issued by U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that illustrate these inconsistent charging practices
are on file with the author.
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propriately charged under section [1182] or [1227]. It is critical,
therefore, that DRO Field Offices work closely with ICE Offices of
Chief Counsel (OCCs) to identify the most appropriate charge(s)
and draft legally sufficient NTAs.265
Anecdotally, inconsistent decision making in the immigration
courts caused DHS to request a published decision on whether refu-
gees should be charged as inadmissible or deportable. In 2012, the
Board apparently obliged by issuing the landmark opinion, Matter of
D-K-.266
3. Matter of D-K-: A Great Leap Forward, But Where Did We
Land?
Matter of D-K- stunned the immigration community, rejecting
both of Garcia’s 1986 holdings. First, the Board overruled Garcia’s
requirement that DHS adjudicate an adjustment application prior to
initiating removal proceedings, finding that the requirement had been
superseded by regulatory amendments.267 Second, the Board held that,
for charging purposes, refugees should be deemed “admitted.”268
Both of these holdings shook up longstanding practice. Yet the Board
did not distance itself from the claim that refugee admission is “condi-
tional,” “impermanent and subject to contingencies.”269
Reflective of the rampant confusion in immigration court, DHS
initially had charged the Respondent with deportability under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227 based on a drug trafficking conviction.270 Subsequently, how-
ever, DHS withdrew and substituted the charge, alleging that the Re-
spondent was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 for the same
265. Memorandum from James Chaparro, Exec. Assoc. Dir., Office of Det. & Re-
moval Operations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Detention of Refugees
Admitted Under INA § 207 Who Have Failed to Adjust to Lawful Permanent Resi-
dent Status, to Field Office Directors, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 2
(May 10, 2010) [hereinafter Chaparro, Memorandum]. The primary purpose of the
memorandum was to halt the ICE practice of detaining refugees for no other reason
than failure to adjust after one year’s presence in the United States. See id.; see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JAILING REFUGEES: ARBITRARY DETENTION OF REFUGEES IN
THE US WHO FAIL TO ADJUST TO PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 13–22 (2009) (find-
ing that DHS arbitrarily detained unadjusted refugees).
266. 25 I&N Dec. 761 (BIA 2012).
267. Id. at 761, 766. I disagree with the Board’s analysis. See Laura Murray-Tjan,
Matter of D-K-: A Great Leap Forward in Refugee Jurisprudence?, 89 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 921 (2012); Laura Murray-Tjan, Board of Immigration Appeals Disavows
Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray in Unpublished Remand, 88 INTERPRETER RELEASES
2870 (2011).
268. D-K-, 25 I&N Dec. at 761.
269. Id. at 767.
270. See id. at 762.
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conviction.271 The IJ sustained the inadmissibility charge and denied
the Respondent’s application for adjustment of status and a § 1159(c)
waiver.272 Because the Board found on appeal that the Respondent
was “admitted” for charging purposes, the Board remanded his case
for DHS to amend the charges “and for the [IJ] to further address the
issue of the respondent’s removability and his eligibility for relief.”273
The Board’s turnaround in D-K- was eased by post-IIRIRA
amendments to the regulations. As explained above, when Garcia was
decided, the regulations stated that refugees denied adjustment by the
former INS could renew their request in “exclusion” proceedings.274
In 1996, however, IIRIRA did away with “exclusion” and “deporta-
tion” proceedings—creating the single umbrella of “removal proceed-
ings.” The regulations were amended to match in 1998, stating that
refugees could renew requests for adjustment “in removal proceed-
ings.”275 Indeed, the Board noted in D-K- that the regulatory language
no longer assumed that refugees would be placed in “exclusion”
proceedings.276
In its analysis of just what refugee “admission” is, the Board
started off with a discussion of Matter of Jean. The Board noted that
the Attorney General in Jean had characterized refugee “admission”
as a “conditional,” rather than “permanent[ ]” admission.277 The
Board indicated its agreement with this characterization:
We acknowledge the conditional nature of a refugee’s status. How-
ever, the fact that a refugee admission is impermanent and subject
to contingencies does not resolve the question whether it neverthe-
less qualifies as a kind of “admission” for purposes of the de-
portability grounds at [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)].278
The Board acknowledged that its case law had never explained
the “conditionality” of refugee admission, and tipped its hat to DHS’
claim that refugee admission was not a “‘true’ admission.”279 Ulti-
mately, however, the Board found that unresolvable procedural
271. Id. The respondent was also charged with inadmissibility for a crime involving
moral turpitude and on the ground that “reason to believe” existed that he had engaged
in controlled substance trafficking. Id.
272. Id. The IJ also denied the Respondent’s applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Id.
273. Id. at 770.
274. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. R
275. Adjustment of Refugees and Asylees: Processing Under Direct Mail Program,
63 Fed. Reg. 30,105, 30,109 (June 3, 1998) (amending 8 C.F.R. § 209.1).
276. D-K-, 25 I&N Dec. at 766.
277. Id. at 767.
278. Id. (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added).
279. Id.
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problems created by charging refugees under § 1182 forced a determi-
nation that refugees are “admitted” for charging purposes:
We . . . recognize that the concept of a ‘conditional admission’ is
not without ambiguity. The proposition that such a status does not
qualify as a “true” admission, which can require the bringing of
charges on deportability rather than inadmissibility grounds, has
some persuasive force. But if a refugee has not been “admitted,”
and also has not been paroled in view of the restrictive language at
[8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), generally prohibiting the parole of refu-
gees], then the nature of his or her status becomes unclear. . . . To
the extent that the pertinent language is ambiguous, we believe that
a construction recognizing that a “conditional admission” is never-
theless a form of “admission” for purposes of [charging under the
deportability grounds at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)] would best comport
with the overall structure of the statute.280
What the Board never acknowledges is that this “ambiguous”
language—“conditional admission”—appears nowhere in the statute.
Litigation in the immigration courts effectively forced the Board to
find that the grounds of deportability applied to refugees for charging
purposes—but it preserved for other procedural and constitutional
analyses the concept of “conditional admission.” The Board did so
even though the concept of “conditional admission” was rooted in its
own case law, and notwithstanding the elimination of language from
the regulations that supported (or led to) its holding in Garcia.
It is possible that the Board qualified its holding out of deference
to the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Jean. On the other
hand, the Attorney General’s reference to the “conditional” nature of
refugee admission was dictum, and he relied on the Board’s own pre-
cedent in Matter of Garcia, which was grounded in a different regula-
tory scheme.281 In other words, it is unclear why deference would
have driven the Board to address “conditionality” at all. It remains to
be seen whether the analytical smoke and mirrors were face-saving,
deferential to the Attorney General in Jean, or had deeper procedural
and constitutional purposes.
I disagree with the Board’s continued adherence to the “condi-
tional” label. The consistent meaning doctrine and a plain reading of
the statute lead to the conclusion that refugees are admitted, and that
their admission is no less a “true” admission than any other admission.
Refugees are in the same legal position, with the same procedural and
280. Id. at 767–68 (emphasis added).
281. Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373, 374 n.4 (citing Garcia, 19 I&N Dec. 407, 408–10 (BIA
1996)).
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constitutional rights, as other “admitted” noncitizens. Refugee admis-
sion is a “kind of admission” only insofar as all “admissions” are a
“kind of admission.” Noncitizens are admitted in a range of different
statuses, including lawful permanent residency and non-immigrant
visas such as student, tourist, and employment visas.282 All such per-
sons are deemed “admitted,” with the substantive and procedural priv-
ileges that come with “admission.” All such persons may be deported,
however, if they violate the conditions of their status.
Matter of D-K- was a welcome step in the right direction, but did
not resolve the issue of refugee “admission” once and for all. Adjudi-
cators, scholars, and litigators must bolster and build on its holding.
Refugees’ “admitted” status does not and cannot relate only to DHS
charging decisions. Refugee status must be interpreted consistently
across all areas of immigration law and constitutional jurisprudence.
B. Asylees
For refugees, the issue appears clear cut, notwithstanding the case
law: Refugee status is an admission, with all the accompanying sub-
stantive and procedural rights. The analysis of whether asylum is an
admission, on the other hand, and whether that admission “disappears”
if asylum is terminated, requires more nuanced investigation and inter-
pretation. Thus, I work my way through statutory, regulatory, and case
law developments, as well as agency guidance. I conclude that a grant
of asylum amounts to an “admission” to the United States, and that the
admission survives any termination of asylum—just as loss of other
types of status in immigration law does not “erase” any admission that
accompanied them. The Board disagreed that asylum is an admission
in a very recent precedent opinion, Matter of V-X-,283 but the decision
ignores the above-cited sources and the development of the Board’s
own case law, in addition to generating absurdities. The Board re-
manded the respondent’s case in Matter of V-X-. In the event of an
appeal, the Board should reconsider its holding. Failing that, higher
courts should reverse.
1. The Statutory Language
As discussed above, the Refugee Act of 1980 was silent as to
whether a grant of asylum amounted to an “admission” or “entry.”
Although the Act in its final form eliminated earlier language in the
House bill that labeled asylum a “conditional admission,” it attached
282. See BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 97–126. R
283. 26 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 2013).
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conditionality to asylum status insofar as it provided that the status
was terminable if an asylee no longer risked persecution.284 That con-
ditionality remains in the statute, with additional grounds for
termination.285
Today, there is still no statutory language explicitly stating that
an asylum grant is or is not an “admission.” One intriguing provision,
8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(3), which was added in 1996, begs the question
without providing the answer: “An alien [whose asylum status has
been terminated] is subject to any applicable grounds of inadmissibil-
ity or deportability under section [sic] 1182(a) and 1227(a)[.]”286
As discussed earlier, the grounds of inadmissibility apply only to
those noncitizens who are applicants for admission, while the grounds
of deportability apply only to persons who were previously admitted.
How can it be that former asylees are potentially subject to both sets
of grounds?
There are at least three ways to read the provision. First, asylum
is not an admission, and former asylees are subject to the grounds of
inadmissibility or deportability depending on whether they were ad-
mitted prior to the asylum grant—for example, on a tourist or business
visa. Alternatively, asylum is an admission, but the admission “disap-
pears” if the status is revoked, returning the noncitizen to the status
she held before the asylum grant—which may or may not have
amounted to an admission.287 Third, asylum results in an admission,
and that admission remains intact even if asylum status is lost.
Under the third understanding, termination of asylee status would
usually lead to deportability. Asylees would be inadmissible only in
instances where they departed the United States and sought to return,
becoming applicants for admission. According to an INS General
Counsel memorandum of 2001, for example, a returning asylee “must
be examined as to his or her admissibility.”288 If a ground of inadmis-
284. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 201(b), § 208(b), 94 Stat. 102,
105.
285. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (2012).
286. Id. § 1158(c)(3). This section was enacted by IIRIRA. Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C,
§ 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-693.
287. This is the view that the government advocated in Second Circuit case Sesay,
and that the Second Circuit accepted under Chevron deference principles, even as it
left the issue open for a “properly briefed” case. Sesay v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 74 F. App’x 84, 88 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2003).
288. See Legal Memorandum from Bo Cooper, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., Readmission of Refugees and Asylees without Travel Documents, to
Michael Pearson, Exec. Assoc. Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. 2 (Nov.
23, 1999) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 223.3(d)(2)(i)) [hereinafter Cooper, Memorandum].
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sibility applies that is also a ground for terminating asylum, then the
asylee would be charged with inadmissibility and placed in removal
proceedings.289 Because the memorandum repeatedly refers to
asylees’ “readmission,” it assumes that initial asylum grants are
“admissions.”
The third reading seems the simplest and most logical way to
understand section 1158(c)(3), and is harmonious with other areas of
immigration law relating to loss of status that was obtained through an
admission. For example, admission on a fiance´ visa is contingent on
marriage within ninety days of admission.290 Loss of a fiance´ visa
does not result, however, in a “disappearance” of the admission.
Rather, failure to marry is treated as a violation of the conditions of a
non-immigrant visa, and the noncitizen becomes subject to the
grounds of deportability, not inadmissibility.291 Similarly, termination
of conditional permanent residency—a status that most commonly
arises when permanent residency is obtained through marriage—may
occur due to a noncitizen’s failure to apply timely for removal of the
conditions.292 However, this renders the conditional resident deport-
able, not inadmissible.293 This holds true even if conditional residency
is terminated because it was obtained through a fraudulent mar-
riage.294 Thus, termination of status generally results in deportability.
It does not erase an earlier admission.295
Rescission of lawful permanent residency may be the exception
that proves the rule. The Attorney General “shall rescind” adjustment
of status if it “appear[s] . . . that the person was not in fact eligible for
such adjustment of status, . . . and the person shall thereupon be sub-
ject to all provisions of [the INA] to the same extent as if the adjust-
289. See id.
290. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K) (2012).
291. See id. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i).
292. For a careful analysis of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.),
that created this type of conditional permanent residency, see Joe A. Tucker, Assimila-
tion to the United States: A Study of the Adjustment of Status and the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Statutes, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 20, 28–51 (1989).
293. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D).
294. Id. § 1227(a)(1)(G).
295. The same is true, for example, for loss of a student visa due to unauthorized
work, or loss of any non-immigrant visa due to commission of certain crimes. See 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (making noncitizens deportable for status violations); 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.1(g) (2013) (setting forth criminal grounds specific to the revocation of non-
immigrant visas); BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 108 (discussing student visas). R
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ment of status had not been made.”296 A crucial difference between
rescission of adjustment of status and termination of asylum is that
asylum can be terminated despite an initially valid grant. Rescission
has a punitive cast, whereas changed circumstances in the country of
origin, for example, or travel back to the country of origin years after
receiving asylum,297 should not invalidate an earlier asylum grant.
Finally, it must be noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(3) was codified
in the context of large-scale reform of the asylum system designed to
prevent perceived abuses. It may well be that the provision was not
intended to make any sort of statement as to whether asylum is an
admission—but rather to cast the net as widely as possible to ensure
that no undeserving former asylee escaped removal. By specifically
providing for charging under the grounds of either inadmissibility or
deportability, Congress avoided any scenario impeding deportation. In
any event, I advocate the third interpretation discussed above because
of its congruence with other areas of immigration law.
2. The Regulations and Agency Guidance
Because the statute and its legislative history do not provide a
definite answer, I next examine the regulations. The regulations have
evolved over time, from stating that asylum was not an “admission” in
1982, towards terming a grant of asylum an “admission” in today’s
iteration.
The first set of regulations—which were introduced on June 2,
1980 and remained in effect until 1990—provided that asylum status
was valid for only one year.298 Asylees were required to undergo in-
terviews annually to extend their status.299 The regulations indicated
that termination of asylum would restore the status (or lack thereof)
previously held by the asylee. Thus, a former asylee would be subject
to exclusion proceedings if, at the time of the asylum grant, he or she
was an applicant for admission.300 If the asylee had “entered” prior to
the asylum grant, however, he or she would be subject to deportation
proceedings.301 The inherently temporary nature of the status de-
scribed in the regulations, coupled with the mandate to institute exclu-
sion proceedings against former asylees who had not otherwise
296. 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a). For examples of rescission, see Adams v. Holder, 692 F.3d
91 (2d Cir. 2012); Estrada v. Holder, 604 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2010); and Ali v. Reno,
22 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1994).
297. See USCIS, TRAVEL FACT SHEET, supra note 175. R
298. See 45 Fed. Reg. 37,392, 37,394 (June 2, 1980); 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e) (1990).
299. 45 Fed. Reg. at 37,394; 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e) (1990).
300. 45 Fed. Reg. at 37,795; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (1990).
301. 45 Fed. Reg. at 37,795; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(a) (1990).
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“entered” the United States, strongly suggests that asylum did not
amount to “admission.” Rather, the regulations created a system
whereby an asylee’s presence was merely tolerated until the risk of
persecution abated.302 In light of the Refugee Act’s silence on the is-
sue, the regulations were a perfectly fair implementation of the Act.
By 1990, the waters had muddied. On July 27 of that year, the
INS promulgated a rule establishing new procedures relating to asy-
lum. Although the regulations continued to provide for the initiation of
exclusion or deportation proceedings against asylees whose status was
revoked, the earlier language indicating which type of proceedings ap-
plied to whom had disappeared.303 In fact, a 1988 proposed rule ex-
pressly provided that any asylee who lost asylum would be placed in
deportation proceedings,304 but that language was deleted from the
final rule.305
After IIRIRA, a new interim rule was promulgated, doubtless in
response to the collapse of exclusion and deportation proceedings into
removal proceedings. Under the interim rule, which controlled until
2000, “[w]hen an alien’s asylum status or withholding of removal or
deportation is terminated . . ., the Service shall initiate removal pro-
ceedings . . . if the alien is not already in exclusion, deportation, or
removal proceedings.”306 This language remained in the rule when it
became final in 2000,307 and is still there today.308
While these changes eliminated the regulations’ earlier clarity, a
separate provision in the 1990 rule contained the first indication that
asylees are “admitted.” The provision established procedures for ac-
cording asylum status to an asylee’s derivatives, and was entitled “Ad-
mission of asylee’s spouse and childen.”309 That title was also
302. Asylees also could apply for adjustment of status, but the 10,000 adjustment cap
in place until 2005 meant that asylees often had to wait many years before adjustment
could occur. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, sec. 101(g), § 209, 119 Stat.
302, 305 (removing the cap).
303. See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,685–86 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.24(e)).
304. 53 Fed. Reg. 11,300, 11,308 (proposed Apr. 6, 1988).
305. See 55 Fed. Reg. at 30,674–88.
306. 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,344 (Mar. 6, 1997) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.20(b)
(1998)).
307. See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,136 (Dec. 6, 2000) (codified
at 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(e)).
308. 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(e) (2013). The parallel regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24 con-
tains identical language. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24(e) (2013).
309. 55 Fed. Reg. at 30,685 (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.21 (1991)) (emphasis added).
Although a title may not substitute for or supplant textual language, titles are useful
interpretive aids when the text is ambiguous. See LINDA JELLUM, MASTERING STATU-
TORY INTERPRETATION 123 (2008) (collecting cases); but cf. generally Stack, supra
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employed in the 1987 and 1988 proposed rules preceding issuance of
the final rule in 1990.310 When read in its entirety, the provision ap-
pears to equate asylum status with an admission:
Admission of asylee’s spouse and children.
A spouse . . . or child . . . may also be granted asylum if accompa-
nying or following to join the principal alien[.]311
Derivatives “accompanying” the principal claimant are spouses
and children present in the United States at the time of the asylum
grant. Derivatives who are “following to join” are usually those
spouses and children immigrating from abroad. The latter group is in-
spected at the border and makes a lawful entry that conforms to the
definition of “admission” at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (i.e., a lawful en-
try following inspection and authorization by an immigration officer).
This lends further support to the theory that asylum amounts to an
admission. It would be absurd for derivatives to have a status superior
to that of the principal. It also would be absurd for family members
joining the asylee from abroad to be in a better legal position than
those already in the United States.
Amendments to the regulations over the course of the 1990s and
the early 2000s left this language intact.312
Also, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 209.2 governing asylees’ ad-
justment of status terms a grant of asylum an “admission.” The regula-
tion reads in pertinent part: “The provisions of this section shall be the
sole and exclusive procedure for adjustment of status by an asylee
admitted under section 208 of the Act whose application is based on
his or her asylee status.”313
Because the pertinent language survived regulatory amendments
post-dating IIRIRA, one may presume that the former INS and DHS
understood the import of employing the term “admission” when
describing derivative asylum grants and prescribing procedures for
asylees’ adjustment of status.
note 226, at 357-60 (noting the absence of a consistent jurisprudential methodology R
for interpreting regulations).
310. 53 Fed. Reg. 11,300, 11,308 (proposed Apr. 6, 1988); 52 Fed. Reg. 32,552,
32,559 (proposed Aug. 28, 1987).
311. 55 Fed. Reg. at 30,685.
312. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(a) (2013); Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121,
76,136 (Dec. 6, 2000) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(a) (2001)); 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312,
10,344 (Mar. 6, 1997) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(a) (1998)); 59 Fed. Reg. 62,284,
62,301 (Dec. 5, 1994) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(a) (1995)).
313. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2 (2013) (emphasis added). The parallel regulation at 8 C.F.R.
§ 1209.2 contains identical language. See 8 C.F.R. § 1209.2 (2013).
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Finally, as indicated previously, the agency that authors the regu-
lations has characterized a grant of asylum as an admission. In his
memorandum entitled “Readmission of Asylees and Refugees Without
Travel Documents,” former INS General Counsel Bo Cooper not only
suggested in the title that asylum status is an admission, but in the
body of the memorandum also repeatedly referenced asylees’ “read-
mission” at the border and referred to asylees’ ability to apply for
admission anew when not in possession of a travel document.314
3. Pre-2013 Case Law
The slim body of case law in this area teaches us little beyond
what we have learned from the statute, the regulations, and INS mem-
oranda. Certainly, prior to Matter of V-X-, the case law appeared to be
moving towards an assumption that asylum amounted to an admission,
albeit crookedly. For example, a review of Board cases granting asy-
lum prior to Matter of V-X- indicates a growing inclination towards
ordering noncitizens “admitted as asylees.”315 This only makes sense,
because the regulations characterize asylum as an admission, and the
regulations are binding on Immigration Judges and the Board. In cases
where asylum was not deemed an admission, it appears that adjudica-
tors did not actually spot and analyze the issue.
a. Mansoor v. Montgomery
The 1985 case Mansoor v. Montgomery316 relates the procedural
obstacles encountered by an Iraqi who was granted asylum in 1980,
but whose status was terminated in 1983 following the annual inter-
view mandated by the regulations then in force.317 Because Mansoor
314. See Cooper, Memorandum, supra note 288; see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMI- R
GRATION SERV., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES MANUAL 146 (2007) (describing
an asylee who travels abroad and seeks to re-enter the United States at a port of entry
as “seeking re-admission to the U.S.”); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., AF-
FIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES MANUAL 144 (2003) (same).
315. In the following cases, the Board entered an order granting asylum without
terming the grant an “admission”: Y-T-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 601 (BIA 2003); X-P-T-, 21
I&N Dec. 634 (BIA 1996); D-V-, 21 I&N Dec. 77 (BIA 1993); Izatula, 20 I&N Dec.
149 (BIA 1990); Villalta, 20 I&N Dec. 142 (BIA 1990); Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA
1987), superseded on other grounds by regulation, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,284, 62,301
(1994). However, several of the more recent cases order the claimant “admitted as an
asylee.” See, e.g., S-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 1328, 1337 (BIA 2000); S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486,
497 (BIA 1996); Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1996). The use of such lan-
guage in Matter of Kasinga is particularly noteworthy, because it is one of the best-
known cases in immigration law. Anecdotally, these cases led many thoughtful immi-
gration scholars to view asylum as an admission.
316. 620 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
317. See id. at 709.
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initially had been paroled when he sought asylum at the border, he
was once again deemed an applicant for admission and placed in ex-
clusion proceedings.318 Mansoor’s applications for asylum and with-
holding were denied, and he was ordered excluded.319 At this point in
time, the regulations were clear, and did not contradict the statute.
Mansoor—although heartbreaking—was rightly decided. Were Man-
soor deemed admitted, he would have been eligible to apply for sus-
pension of deportation, a discretionary waiver allowing persons to
remain under sympathetic circumstances.320 By the time he was or-
dered excluded, Mansoor had a five-year old son in the United States
whose mother received public assistance, and who depended on Man-
soor for financial and emotional support.321 In other words, Mansoor
had accumulated equities in the United States that might have allowed
him to remain, had his asylum grant been deemed a lasting admission.
The regulations Mansoor applied are fortunately no longer ex-
tant. Subsequent case law suggested without firmly establishing that
asylum is an admission. Below, I discuss some of the more notable
cases.
b. Sesay v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Possibly the only case that squarely confronted the issue prior to
Matter of V-X- is the Second Circuit’s lengthy, unpublished opinion
Sesay v. Immigration & Naturalization Service.322 In this 2003 case,
the Second Circuit applied Chevron deference principles to uphold the
Board’s finding that a grant of asylum amounts to an “entry.”323 How-
ever, the court specifically indicated that it would reconsider the ques-
tion whether asylees are “admitted” or necessarily have effected an
“entry” if and when a “fully briefed and properly argued” case came
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 710–11.
321. Id. at 709–10.
322. 74 F. App’x 84 (2d Cir. 2003). The petitioner in Tanov v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Service attempted to argue that an IJ’s grant of asylum, coupled with the
issuance of an I-94, amounted to an admission. See 443 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2006).
However, the Second Circuit deemed the argument waived, and additionally observed
that because the Board reversed the IJ there was never a final agency order granting
asylum in any event. Id. at 200–01. Thus, the Second Circuit in Tanov was not re-
quired to decide whether a grant of asylum amounted to an admission. A Magistrate
Judge in the District of Arizona later misread Tanov, describing it as “at least one”
instance in which a federal court found that an asylum grant plus an I-94 equals ad-
mission. Singh v. Vasquez, No. CIV 08-01901, 2009 WL 3219196, at *4 n.6 (D. Ariz.
Feb. 5, 2009).
323. Sesay, 74 F. App’x at 88.
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before it.324 Ironically, at oral argument, Sesay’s counsel “disclaimed”
the contention that asylum is not “admission”—apparently in response
to the panel’s questioning.325 One would assume that the government
did not disagree.
The petitioner in Sesay was an official in a democratically
elected Sierra Leonean government overthrown in a 1997 coup.326 The
new regime forced the petitioner to continue occupying a government
post, but he fled the country as soon as he was able.327 His asylum
application was complicated, however, by President Clinton’s 1998
proclamation suspending the “entry” into the United States of any
member of the Sierra Leonean regime.328 An IJ, and subsequently the
Board, found the petitioner ineligible for asylum as a matter of law,
because the proclamation barred his “entry” into the United States.329
Before the Second Circuit, the petitioner argued that he could
have been granted asylum and then paroled into the United States, and
that the Board was wrong in finding that asylum necessarily entailed
an “entry.”330 The Second Circuit opined that his strongest support
stemmed from the statutory provision that, upon termination of asy-
lum, a former asylee becomes subject to any applicable ground of in-
admissibility or deportability331—the provision discussed above at
Part III.B.1. The court thus stated,
Because inadmissibility by definition only applies to aliens who
have not yet been admitted to the United States—that is, to aliens
who have not legally “entered” the country—the fact that an alien
becomes subject to inadmissibility upon termination of asylum sta-
tus could indicate that asylees have never effected an entry into the
United States as that term is used in the INA.332
The government countered, however, that the Board’s interpreta-
tion could be reconciled with the statute on the reading that termina-
tion of asylum strips away the entry and the admission that came with
it—returning the noncitizen to “‘square one’: seeking admission and
324. Id. at 88 & n.6.
325. Id. at 87–88 (“In questioning Sesay’s counsel about this point at oral argument,
however, counsel expressly disclaimed this theory, stating: ‘I don’t deny that a person
seeking asylum is seeking to be admitted because they will be admitted if they’re
granted asylum.’”) (citations omitted).
326. Id. at 85.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 85–86.
329. Id. at 86.
330. Id. at 86–87.
331. Id. at 88.
332. Id.
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admissibility.”333 In other words, the government advocated for the
second of the three interpretations I outlined above at Part III.B.1. The
Second Circuit, in according Chevron deference, found it “could not
say with certainty that the BIA’s interpretation is ‘manifestly contrary
to the statute.’”334 However, the Second Circuit was obviously unsat-
isfied with its own conclusion, as it deliberately left the question
open.335
c. Hernandez-Vasquez v. Holder
In the 2011 unpublished opinion Hernandez-Vasquez v. Holder,
the Sixth Circuit upheld the removal order of a derivative asylee who
had been charged with inadmissibility in removal proceedings.336 The
opinion does not directly address whether derivative asylum status is
an admission. Rather, it illustrates the disturbing lack of careful analy-
sis as to how asylees should be charged and dealt with in removal
proceedings.
The petitioner first entered the United States without inspection
but was granted asylum in 1989 as his mother’s derivative.337 In 2005,
he was convicted of child endangerment.338 DHS initiated removal
proceedings in 2006.339 Notwithstanding his asylee status, DHS
charged the petitioner with inadmissibility for being present without
admission or parole and for having a conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude.340 The IJ terminated the petitioner’s asylum status on
the ground that his conviction was for a “particularly serious crime”
and sustained the charges of inadmissibility.341 Petitioner’s applica-
tions for withholding of removal, protection under the Convention
Against Torture, and a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility were
denied by the IJ and subsequently the Board.342 The sole issue on
333. Id.
334. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984)). The District of Massachusetts in Balasundaram v. Chadbourne
cited Sesay for the proposition that a grant of asylum is an admission. See 716 F.
Supp. 2d 158, 160 (D. Mass. 2010). The court also stated in dictum (without analysis)
that when a noncitizen’s asylum status is revoked, so is his “admitted” status. See id.
One of the implications of the holding is that the very learned District Judge Young
located no stronger statement than the Second Circuit’s lukewarm finding in Sesay.
See id.
335. Id. at 88 n.6.
336. 430 F. App’x 448, 449–50, 453 (6th Cir. 2011).
337. Id. at 449.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 450.
342. Id.
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appeal was whether the Board correctly found that the petitioner’s
conviction was a “particularly serious crime” warranting termination
of asylum.343 The Sixth Circuit found that it was.344
Hernandez-Vasquez is notable in that the petitioner was a deriva-
tive asylee; in that one of the glimmers of light as to the proper way to
charge asylees is the DHS-issued regulation labeling derivative asy-
lum an “admission”; and yet DHS charged him under the grounds of
inadmissibility. Was the IJ cognizant of this regulation, but sustained
the inadmissibility charges for the reason articulated by the govern-
ment in Sesay—i.e., that asylees return to “square one” following ter-
mination of asylum? Or did the IJ sustain the charges merely because
they went unchallenged, in other words, without even thinking about
it? The Sixth Circuit opinion does not indicate that the IJ undertook
any of these analytical steps—and does not reveal any objection to
DHS’ decision to charge the petitioner as present without admission or
parole. In this situation, a petitioner who otherwise could defend
against removal through an adjustment of status application would be
barred, because entry without inspection is an unwaivable ground of
inadmissibility.345 Moreover, although the Sixth Circuit does not dis-
cuss the petitioner’s detention status, it should be noted that his single
crime involving moral turpitude would have been more likely to
render him a mandatory detainee once he was categorized as “inad-
missible” rather than “deportable.”346
Notwithstanding the confusion illustrated by Hernandez-Vas-
quez, thoughtful immigration scholars, and apparently even Second
Circuit judges, assumed that asylum amounted to an “admission.” This
is unsurprising in light of the Board’s published precedent ordering
noncitizens “admitted as asylees,” the regulations terming asylum an
“admission,” and the characterization of asylum as an “admission” in
343. Id. at 451.
344. See id. at 451–53. What the opinion does not reveal is any application by the
petitioner for adjustment of status with a refugee waiver, which was an option that
was unquestionably procedurally available. See Matter of K-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 661
(BIA 2004). The Sixth Circuit’s silence on the issue suggests that it never came up—
which alone may have constituted grounds to grant the petition for review. See Men-
doza-Lopez v. United States, 481 U.S. 828, 840 (1987) (removal order invalid where
Immigration Judge did not explain to aliens that they were eligible for suspension of
deportation); Copeland v. United States, 376 F.3d 61, 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating
that failure of an Immigration Judge to apprise alien of right to apply for 212(c) relief
rendered proceedings fundamentally unfair, and removal order correspondingly
invalid).
345. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2013); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 227, at 659. R
346. See supra Part II.B.2.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\17-1\NYL102.txt unknown Seq: 61 19-MAR-14 13:30
2014] “CONDITIONAL ADMISSION” AND OTHER MYSTERIES 97
agency guidance. The surprise came in June 2013, when the Board
published the disappointingly superficial decision, Matter of V-X-.
4. Matter of V-X-: The 2013 Challenge
Like Matter of D-K-, the 2012 decision announcing that resettled
refugees should be deemed “admitted” for charging purposes, the
2013 case Matter of V-X- stunned the immigration community. In
Matter of V-X-, however, the Respondent failed in his attempt to anal-
ogize his status to that of resettled refugees under Matter of D-K- and
was deemed never admitted. The V-X- Respondent was initially pa-
roled into the United States in 2003.347 In 2004, he obtained “asylum
as a derivative beneficiary of his father’s asylum application.”348 Dur-
ing the next several years, he was charged criminally with offenses
relating to distribution of marijuana and home invasion, which re-
sulted in rehabilitative probation, and a conviction plus probationary
incarceration, respectively.349 DHS charged him as inadmissible for a
crime involving moral turpitude and a controlled substance offense,
and for “reason to believe” he had trafficked in controlled sub-
stances.350 The IJ sustained the charges and ordered him removed.351
On appeal, the Respondent contended that DHS charged him im-
properly, arguing that he was not subject to the grounds of inadmissi-
bility because he had been “admitted” as an asylee.352 The Board
disagreed, stating that [t]he respondent . . . identified nothing in the
language of the Act to support his contention that Congress under-
stood a grant of asylum to be a form of ‘admission’ into the United
States.”353 Notwithstanding what the respondent did or did not iden-
tify, the Board failed to address 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(3), the statutory
language analyzed by the Second Circuit in Sesay,354 which provides
that “An alien [whose asylum status has been terminated] is subject to
347. 26 I&N Dec. 147, 150 (BIA 2013). The Board erroneously refers to the Respon-
dent’s parole as an “entry” into the United States. Id. at 148.
348. Id. at 148.
349. See id.
350. Id. at 147.
351. See id. at 147–48.
352. See id. at 150. The Respondent also contended that his marijuana-related of-
fenses were not “convictions,” but rather mere juvenile delinquency adjudications,
because he had been designated a “youthful trainee” under Michigan law. Id. at 152.
For reasons beyond the scope of this Article, the Board found that the “youthful
trainee” designation equated to a “conviction” for immigration law purposes. Id. at
152–53.
353. Id. at 151.
354. See Sesay v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 74 F. App’x 84, 88 (2d Cir.
2003).
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any applicable grounds of inadmissibility or deportability under sec-
tion [sic] 1182(a) and 1227(a).”355
In Sesay, the government argued that this very language meant
that asylum was an “entry” that could be erased if asylum was termi-
nated. A Second Circuit panel pressed the claimant’s attorney into
conceding that asylum was an “admission,” and the government ap-
parently did not counter.356 Doubtless, the Board did or should have
come across Sesay in researching its decision. Although this provision
does not seal the deal by any means, it certainly required reflection
and examination.
Next, the Board rejected the respondent’s argument that the
Board itself recognized that asylum is an admission when it ordered a
respondent “admitted as an asylee” in the 2000 case Matter of S-A-.357
The Board provided two justifications. First, it distinguished between
the “concepts of ‘admission to asylum status’ and ‘admission into the
United States.’” In so doing, however, it coined a new phrase—“ad-
mission to asylum status”—even as it purported to refer to a known
proposition.358 Second, the Board indicated that, because the question
whether asylum is an admission was not at issue in Matter of S-A-, its
usage of the term “admitted” was “gratuitous.”359 Be that as it may,
the language in a final order in any removal case is inherently impor-
tant and substantial to all litigants and adjudicators. It is reasonable to
read the opinion as treating asylum as an “admission.” Moreover, it
would have been more intellectually honest for the Board to acknowl-
edge that Matter of S-A- was not the only instance where it ordered a
claimant “admitted as an asylee,” and that it did so in one of immigra-
tion law’s best known cases, Matter of Kasinga.
Perhaps the Board’s most spurious reasoning was contained in a
footnote. In footnote 3, the Board acknowledged that the regulation
governing asylee adjustment of status characterizes asylum as an “ad-
mission.”360 However, it ignored entirely other regulations that also
refer to asylum as an admission, notably the regulations that govern
the “[a]dmission of an asylee’s spouse and children,” even though the
355. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(3) (2012).
356. See supra note 325. R
357. V-X-, 26 I&N Dec. at 151.
358. Id. (emphasis in original).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 151 n.3 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1209.2 (2013), which provides that “[t]he pro-
visions of this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for adjustment of
status by an asylee admitted under section 208 of the Act.”). Note that this regulation
was recodified as recently as November 2009. The parallel regulation at 8 C.F.R.
§ 209.2 contains the identical opening sentence.
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V-X- Respondent was a derivative asylee.361 The Board’s basis for
rebutting the regulatory language is interesting, but ultimately
unsatisfying:
That characterization [of asylum as an admission] is substantially
contradicted, however, by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(c) (2013), which
clarifies that a grant of asylum does not require a threshold inspec-
tion for admissibility, the sine qua non of an “admission,” either at
a port of entry or through adjustment of status.362
First, the regulation does not specifically state this—which ex-
plains why the Board does not refer to a particular subsection of the
regulation or directly quote its language. Rather, the regulation indi-
cates that an asylum officer who denies an asylum application shall
refer any applicant who appears inadmissible or deportable to the im-
migration court for removal proceedings.363 This regulation is un-
remarkable; it simply requires that failed asylum applicants without
status, or who have violated the conditions of status, be placed in re-
moval proceedings.
Second, the Board ignores that asylum is a defense to inadmissi-
bility in removal proceedings, as are several other types of humanita-
rian relief. The INA makes many grounds of inadmissibility
inapplicable to humanitarian petitions, including requests for U visas
for crime victims, green cards for the battered spouses of U.S. citizens
or lawful permanent residents, and Special Immigrant Juvenile status
for  neglected, abandoned, or abused youths.364 Asylum is unusual in
that most—but not all—grounds of inadmissibility do not apply.365
This makes sense, because asylum protects against exceptional harm
including persecution, torture, and death. An admission protecting
against extreme consequences naturally is not subject to garden-vari-
ety inadmissibility grounds.
361. 8 C.F.R. § 208.21 (2013). The identical language is in the parallel regulation at
8 C.F.R. § 1208.21 (2013).
362. V-X-, 26 I&N Dec. at 151 n.3.
363. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(c)(1) (2013).
364. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(E) (2012) (stating exceptions for U visa applicants
and self-petitioners under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”));
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii) (stating exceptions for VAWA self-petitioners); § 1255(h) (stating
exceptions for Special Immigrant Juveniles); see also, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 245.15(e)
(2013) (setting forth exceptions for applicants for adjustment under the Haitian Refu-
gee Immigrant Fairness Act). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) for the definition of a
special immigrant juvenile, and 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2)(A) for special immigrant
juveniles’ inadmissibility exemptions.
365. The grounds that do apply include the bar against persons who have provided
material support to terrorist organizations, and the bar against persecutors of others.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(v), 1182(a)(3)(E) (2012).
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Finally, the Board’s assertion that no procedural absurdities are
created is open to question. An asylee can petition for children and
spouses to migrate to the United States as derivative asylees, or for
those present in the United States to obtain derivative asylee status. If
an asylum grant is not an admission, derivative asylees would be in a
legal position superior to that of the principal. Derivative asylees
should not be in a better position to protect against detention or re-
moval than the principal who petitioned for them.
At bottom, the Board’s decision in Matter of V-X- is untenable
because it ignores binding regulatory language; the regulations do not
contradict the statute; and following the regulations would avoid pro-
cedural absurdities. It is also disconcerting that the Board, in rendering
a surprising new decision, failed to take into account the INS General
Counsel memorandum of 2001 and other agency guidance.366 Finally,
the Board owed deeper consideration to its own several precedential
opinions where it ordered respondents admitted as asylees, including
Matter of Kasinga, one of the best-known opinions in immigration
law.367 Because Matter of V-X- is out of step with the broader body of
immigration law, it should be challenged and overturned in the higher
courts.
Considering the silence in the statute, the regulatory language
characterizing asylum grants as “admissions,” the importance of
avoiding procedural absurdities; and the treatment of noncitizens hold-
ing other statuses that are later terminated, I conclude that asylum
should be considered an “admission” that does not vaporize upon ter-
mination of the underlying status. This conclusion is most in harmony
with the governing statutory and regulatory language and the rest of
immigration jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Although the Refugee Act was passed decades ago in 1980, many
of its finer points remain misunderstood and misapplied. Despite the
great leap forward in Matter of D-K-, for example, the Board still read
the nonexistent term “conditional” into the Act to modify refugee “ad-
mission.” In Matter of V-X-, by contrast, the Board made a great leap
backwards from regulatory and interpretive trends in a superficial de-
cision finding that asylum is not an admission. The Board remanded
366. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. R
367. See supra note 315. Matter of Kasinga is standard fare in immigration law R
textbooks. See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 227, at 860, 870, 880–82 (discuss- R
ing and excerpting Matter of Kasinga); LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 28, at R
905, 959 (same).
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the case for new findings. In the event the respondent appeals the im-
migration court decision, the case should be reviewed en banc, or the
federal courts should reverse it.
In general, the admission status of refugees and asylees has not
been carefully explored or explained, and statutory construction of the
relevant portions of the Refugee Act has been correspondingly lack-
ing. The overarching goal of this Article was to rectify this omission. I
have concluded, first, that refugee status is no more conditional than
any other type of admission, and that refugees must be accorded the
same panoply of rights as other admittees. This conclusion became
inevitable following IIRIRA’s introduction of a statutory definition of
admission.
Second, an analysis of the statute and regulations over time leads
to the conclusion that asylum status is also an “admission”—even if
that was not so immediately following the Refugee Act’s passage.
Moreover, consideration of the broader body of immigration law, and
the recognition that loss of status generally does not amount to a loss
of any “admission” that came with it, indicates that even if asylum
status is terminated, the accompanying admission is not. Asylum may
be terminated for something as innocent as travel back to the country
of origin for a family member’s funeral, even years after the asylum
grant, and even if the asylee has since become a lawful permanent
resident.368 Although asylum may also be terminated for crimes and
other bad acts, termination is not necessarily indicative of any sort of
fraud or bad faith on the asylee’s part. It would be tragic if former
asylees necessarily reverted to a status with lesser constitutional pro-
tections simply because they were no longer in danger in their home-
lands. Finally, as discussed in detail above, the Board’s decision in
Matter of V-X- is unsatisfying and the matter must be revisited by the
Board or a higher court.
In addition to answering these questions, I also have sought to
demonstrate why these issues have remained unresolved for so long.
One reason is undoubtedly intellectual inertia: Litigators and adjudica-
tors passively adhered to the concept of refugees as parolees or “con-
ditional entrants” even though the Refugee Act superseded those
modes of refugee resettlement. One of the greatest risks in immigra-
tion law is the tendency to fall back unthinkingly on old intellectual
paradigms. Attorneys and judges are burdened by heavy caseloads.
Noncitizens, especially immigration detainees, lack access to counsel.
368. This is because the noncitizen was eligible for lawful permanent residency on
account of an asylum grant. See USCIS, TRAVEL FACT SHEET, supra note 175. R
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The quality of representation suffers, which in turn contributes to ill-
informed decisionmaking.
My analyses of the case law are surely startling to many. Legal
and procedural mistakes abound. Errors are committed by IJs, DHS,
the Board, and the Attorney General—and even our venerable Article
III courts. That immigration is a weak point of our legal system is no
secret, but I have deliberately highlighted the magnitude of the
problem.
I hasten to add that other areas of immigration law are better
developed, and that certain aspects of the admission concept have
been carefully analyzed by both administrative and Article III tribu-
nals. For example, litigation and adjudication ultimately led to the
Board’s careful exposition in Matter of Alyazji369 on how to ascertain
the date of admission for purposes of assessing removability and eligi-
bility for relief. I submit that one reason for the jurisprudential gap is
that the population affected by the issue in Alyazji—typically lawful
permanent residents with criminal convictions—have better access to
resources than refugee and asylee populations. They may have lived in
the United States longer; enjoyed superior educations; suffer less from
post-traumatic stress disorder and other disabilities that interfere with
asset accumulation; and have larger families in the United States to
pool resources for representation. Refugee and asylee populations,
particularly if detained, compete for free legal services and all too
often go unrepresented.
Finally, in my discussion of the substantive, procedural, and con-
stitutional import of whether a noncitizen has been admitted, I seek to
convey why the literature should focus more attention on the admis-
sion concept. Given that Zadvydas and Martinez have been at issue
during the debates around immigration reform, and will remain at risk
unless and until the Supreme Court renders a constitutional rather than
a statutory decision; and that the question of what categories of nonci-
tizens should be subject to mandatory detention during removal pro-
ceedings frequently arises in congressional debates and bill proposals,
the issue of admission status as it relates to long-term or indefinite
detention will remain a subject of great importance. This Article con-
tributes to an effort to dissect “admission” and the broad range of as-
sociated immigration issues, during the debates over immigration
reform and beyond.
369. 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011).
